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ABSTRACT
This article contends that even with the inconsistent regulatory and
statutory framework governing financial service providers, under
common law, brokers have historically been held to a fiduciary
standard of care when providing personalized investment advice to
retail customers or when holding themselves out to the public as
trusted financial advisors who provide unbiased investment advice.
The Article examines the historical origins of broker-dealers as
fiduciaries; uses statutory construction to give effect to the clear
intent underlying Congress’ enactment of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940; and analyzes judicial treatment of broker-dealers,
including the legal reasoning of why the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 provides a lower level of protection and was never meant to
regulate personalized investment advice. Having two different
standards of care regulating identical conduct is harmful to
consumers; to alleviate this harm, the article provides solutions for
the SEC to move forward including the removal of the broker-dealer
exemption from the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the
creation of a new uniform fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and
investment advisers under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.
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INTRODUCTION
“The relation between a broker and his principal is a fiduciary one,
calling for the exercise of the utmost good faith. It is the duty of the
1
broker to serve his principal to the latter’s best advantage”

Broker-dealers, unlike investment advisers, are not regulated as
fiduciaries when providing investment advice, even though brokerdealers often hold themselves out as financial advisors and offer
virtually identical services to investors. The lack of consistent regulation
of financial service providers arises from the structure in which advice
historically has been delivered. Financial services regulation since the
Great Depression has developed along roughly dual tracks: laws
governing the sale of financial products, which may or may not require
that the products be suitable for the customer, and laws governing
investment advice, which impose a fiduciary requirement on the adviser
to act solely in the best interests of the client. Even with the inconsistent
regulatory and statutory framework, under common law, brokers have
historically been held to a fiduciary standard of care when providing
personalized investment advice to retail customers or when holding
themselves out to the public as trusted financial advisors who provide
unbiased investment advice.
This Article begins by examining the historical origins of brokerdealers as fiduciaries; it uses statutory construction to give effect to the
clear intent underlying Congress’ enactment of the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (Advisers Act), specifically the broker-dealer exemption
included in Section 202(a)(11); and provides a history of the SEC’s
interpretation of the broker-dealer exemption in the Advisers Act. The
Article then analyzes judicial treatment of broker-dealers, including the
legal reasoning of why the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act) provides a lower level of protection and was never meant to
regulate personalized investment advice, and examines a broker’s right
to use of “puffery” and “sales talk”, and discusses the issue of financial
advisors’ ability to “switch hats” and provide services under different
standards of care. The Article concludes by opining how two different
standards of care regulating identical conduct is harmful to consumers
and provides solutions for the SEC to move forward. Those solutions
include the removal of the broker-dealer exemption from the Advisers

1.

Easterly v. Mills, 54 Wash. 356, 359 (Wash. 1909).
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Act and the creation of a new uniform fiduciary duty for broker-dealers
and investment advisers under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).2
I. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS: BROKERS AS FIDUCIARIES
A. PRE-EXCHANGE AND ADVISERS ACT COURT CASES
Throughout the history of the financial services industry, brokers
who provided anything more than transactional assistance were deemed
to be acting as fiduciaries towards their clients. It is important to look at
the legal landscape before enactment of the Advisers Act to see how
brokers have historically been treated.
As far back as 1875, brokers were seen as fiduciaries when
providing advice to customers. In Crosby v. Watts, an action was
brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, a broker, for an
accounting on the purchase of shares of stock.3 The Superior Court of
New York held that “a broker acting in such a case, in a fiduciary
capacity, should be able to show from his books when referring to them
not only the purchase, but on whose account and by whom made. The
party relying upon the trusted action of his agent is entitled to this, the
best evidence of fair dealing.”4 In Gallagher v. Jones, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that brokers are held to a higher standard because the client
trusts and relies on the advice provided.5
In Kennedy v. Budd, the Supreme Court of New York opined that
when a broker’s duties “as to the further performance of the contract
after the purchase has been made, and recollect that he has no interest in
the contract, except the commissions which he earns; that he is bound to
act solely for the benefit of his customer, and bound to give her his best
judgment, and to take no advantage of her,–it is quite clear that to that
extent he acts in a fiduciary capacity.”6 In Haight v. Haight & Freese
2. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824-30 (2010)
(codified as enacted in 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012)).
3. Crosby v. Watts, 49 How. Pr. 364, 364 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875).
4. Id. at 365.
5. Gallagher v. Jones, 129 U.S. 193, 201 (1889) (“. . . cases in which a trust
relation exists between the parties,—a relation which would probably be deemed to
exist between a stock-broker and his client.”).
6. Kennedy v. Budd, 5 A.D. 140, 143-44 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896) (citing
Gallagher, 129 U.S. at 198).
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Co., the Supreme Court of New York held that “defendant in this action
was acting as plaintiff’s agent and broker. Such a relationship is a
fiduciary one, and an action will lie for an accounting therein, wherein
the burden will lie upon the agent to show that his trust duties have been
performed, and the manner of their performance.”7
In Easterly v. Mills, the Supreme Court of Washington held that
“[t]he relation between a broker and his principal is a fiduciary one,
calling for the exercise of the utmost good faith. It is the duty of the
broker to serve his principal to the latter’s best advantage, and all profits
which are the result of the relation belong to the principal.”8 In Clark v.
Pratt, the plaintiffs brought an action for the cancellation of an oil and
gas lease against the defendant, who was a real estate agent and oil lease
broker.9 The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that “in a suit to cancel
the lease so surreptitiously obtained by the broker, the court will decree
a cancellation of the lease, and refuse to permit the broker to take
advantage of his fiduciary relations.”10
In Lavers v. Hutton, the plaintiff requested an accounting from the
defendants, his stock-brokers.11 The New York Supreme Court held that
“undoubtedly the relation between customer and broker is fiduciary, and
the customer’s proper action is for equitable accounting.”12 In Goodman
v. Wann, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that “[a] broker occupies
a fiduciary relationship to his customer and is trustee of money coming
into his hands as profits on his customers’ transactions.”13 In Rubin v.
Salomon, the New York Supreme Court held that “[a] fiduciary relation
exists between the broker and the customer.”14 In Warwick v. Addicks,
the Superior Court of Delaware held that “[t]he relation of an agent to
his principal is ordinarily that of a fiduciary, and, as such, it is his duty
in all dealings concerning or affecting the subject matter of his agency to
act with the utmost good faith and loyalty for the furtherance and
advancement of the interests of his principal. A broker with the power to
buy and sell securities for another is an agent for such person and . . . is
bound to do only that which good business men of the same grade and
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Haight v. Haight & Freese Co., 92 N.Y.S. 934, 936 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1905).
Easterly v. Mills, 54 Wash. 356, 359 (Wash. 1909).
Clark v. Pratt, 220 P. 903, 903 (Okla. 1923).
Id. at 904.
Lavers v. Hutton, 203 N.Y.S. 235, 235 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1924).
Id.
Goodman v. Wann, 11 Tenn. App. 560, 567 (Tenn Ct. App. 1930).
Rubin v. Salomon, 241 N.Y.S. 495, 529 (Mun. Ct. 1930).
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locality are accustomed to do under similar circumstances; or, that
which a prudent man would do in regard to his own affairs.”15
In Oliver Brothers v. Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission directed petitioners to cease and desist from payment or
receipt of fees or commissions in violation of Section 2(c) of the
Robinson-Patman Act.16 The order was entered in a proceeding
instituted against Oliver Brothers, Inc.; the charge was that, while acting
as agent for the buyers, Oliver received brokerage commissions from the
sellers that it credited or passed on to the buyers.17 Oliver Brothers
petitioned to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for review. The Fourth
Circuit held that “[t]he relation of the broker to his client is a fiduciary
one. To collect from a client for service rendered in the interest of a
party adverse to him, is a violation of that relationship; and to protect
those who deal in the streams of commerce against breaches of faith in
its relations of trust, is to foster confidence in its processes and promote
its wholesomeness and volume.”18
Based upon the cited cases above, since the late 19th century,
brokers have been found to occupy a position as a fiduciary when
providing anything more than transactional assistance to a client. This
reflects that regardless of any “broker-dealer exemption” found in the
Advisers Act,19 brokers should still be viewed as fiduciaries, because
that is how they were viewed before the Advisers Act was enacted. For
example, nowhere in the Advisers Act does it state that brokers are not
fiduciaries; it only states that brokers, who only provide investment
advice that is “solely incidental” to their brokerage activities and do not
receive special compensation, do not have to register as investment
advisers. This is a significant distinction. The Advisers Act did not
remove any fiduciary responsibility for brokers, it only provided that
they did not have to register as investment advisers.

15.
16.

Warwick v. Addicks, 157 A. 205, 206-07 (Del. Super. Ct. 1931).
Oliver Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763, 764 (4th Cir. 1939). The Robinson-Patman
Act “forbade discrimination in price when the effect of such discrimination was to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create monopoly.” Id. at 767.
17. Id. at 764.
18. Id. at 768.
19. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to -21 (2012).
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II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: BROKER-DEALER EXEMPTION IN
ADVISERS ACT
A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION: GIVING EFFECT TO THE INTENT OF THE
LEGISLATURE
The Advisers Act includes an exemption from investment adviser
registration for broker-dealers. The language of the Advisers Act
exempts from the definition of investment adviser a broker or dealer
who provides investment advice incidental to its broker-dealer business
and who receives no special compensation.20
A basic canon of statutory construction is that words should be
interpreted as taking their ordinary and plain meaning.21 However,
although words should generally be given their plain and ordinary
meaning, that meaning must be in accord with the intent of the
legislature.22 Courts must always construe a federal statute so as to give
effect to the intent of Congress.23 The Supreme Court has been clear on
this point by stating that when courts construe a statute, the objective “is
to ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative
will”24 and that “[s]tatutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.”25
In United States v. Fisk, the Court stated that “[i]n the construction
of statutes, it is the duty of the court to ascertain the clear intention of
the legislature. In order to do this, courts are often compelled to construe
‘or’ as meaning ‘and’ and again ‘and’ as meaning ‘or.’”26 The Court
further stated that “[a]s is often the case in statutes, though the intention
is clear, the words used to express it may be ill chosen.”27 In Peacock v.
Lubbock Compress Co., the Fifth Circuit interpreted the phrase “ginning
and compressing of cotton” to mean “the performance of either or

20.
21.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C).
See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (stating that “[a]
fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning”).
22. United States v. Cook, 384 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1966).
23. Train v. Colo. Pub. Interest Research Grp., Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976).
24. Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975).
25. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
26. United States v. Fisk, 70 U.S. 445, 447 (1865); see also United States v.
Mullendore, 30 F. Supp. 13, 15 (N.D. Okla. 1939) (construing “and” as “or”).
27. Fisk, 70 U.S. at 447.
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both.”28 Subsequently, in Bruce v. First Federal Savings & Loan, the
Fifth Circuit held that “the word ‘and’ is therefore to be accepted for its
conjunctive connotation rather than as a word interchangeable with ‘or’
except where strict grammatical construction will frustrate clear
legislative intent.”29 The Court in Bruce specifically held that “to read
the word ‘and’ in the disjunctive is to give the word its clearly intended
effect. To read it in the conjunctive would nullify legislative intent.”30
A strict grammatical construction of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, where both of the elements (“solely incidental” and “special
compensation”) must be met to exclude a broker from having to register,
nullifies its clear legislative intent. Congress enacted the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 to “protect the public and investors against
malpractices by persons paid for advising others about securities”31 and
because “virtually no limitations or restrictions exist[ed] with respect to
the honesty and integrity of individuals who may solicit funds to be
controlled, managed, and supervised.”32 When it recommended the
Advisers Act to the House, the Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce reported that “[t]he essential purpose of [the Advisers Act] is
to protect the public from the frauds and misrepresentations of
unscrupulous tipsters and touts.”33 Courts will have a much more
difficult time effectuating true Congressional intent of the Advisers Act
if they employ the conjunctive “and.” The reading of “and” as “or” in
the broker-dealer exemption under Section 202(a)(11) of the Advisers
Act is the “only . . . permissible meaning[] [that] produces a substantive
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”34
Courts’ and the SEC’s current construction of the broker-dealer
exemption in the Advisers Act effectively nullifies Congressional intent.
For example, under the current reading of the Advisers Act, a brokerdealer could provide a financial plan for “free” and only be paid by the
commissions on the products sold to the investor. The broker-dealer
28.
29.

Peacock v. Lubbock Compress Co., 252 F.2d 892, 893-95 (5th Cir. 1958).
Bruce v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Conoe, 837 F.2d 712, 715 (5th Cir.

1988).
30. Id. at 717.
31. S. REP. NO. 86-1760, at 1 (1960).
32. Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs. of Boston, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 171, 175 (N.D. Ca.
1977) (quoting S. REP. NO. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940)).
33. H.R. REP. NO. 76-2639, at 28 (1940).
34. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988).
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could argue that since he did not receive any compensation outside of
commissions, even though he provided the investor with substantial
investment advice in the form of a “financial plan,” he would not be
required to register as an investment adviser. Broker-dealers could also
hold themselves out as financial advisors providing unbiased investment
advice, but then subsequently state that they were only providing that
advice as part of their brokerage activities and only charged
commissions on products sold to the investor.
These actions undermine the Congressional intent underlying the
Advisers Act, that it was, in part, proposed due to “organizations using
the descriptive title of investment counsel [who] were in reality dealers
or brokers offering to give advice free in anticipation of sales and
brokerage commissions on transactions executed upon such free
advice.”35 To effectuate the true legislative purpose of the Advisers Act,
a broker-dealer would not qualify for an exemption if he or she provided
investment advice that was not solely incidental to his or her brokerage
practice or received special compensation for that advice.
This construction of the Advisers Act is further supported by
Supreme Court jurisprudence that promotes a remedial and flexible view
of the Advisers Act. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the
Supreme Court held that “Congress intended the [Advisers Act] to be
construed like other securities legislation ‘enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds,’ not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to
effectuate its remedial purposes.”36 Lower courts take the same view of
the Advisers Act, for example, in SEC v. Myers, the Federal District
Court for the District of Maryland held that the Advisers Act “should
properly be construed to provide the widest possible protection
consistent with legislative purpose and the power of Congress.
Restricted interpretations of the [Advisers] Act . . . would substantially
limit the protection afforded the investing public.”37
B. LEGAL CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
It is important to look at the context surrounding the enactment of
the Advisers Act of 1940. The Supreme Court has consistently stated
that when reviewing Congressional action, courts must take into account
35.
36.
37.

S. REP. NO. 76-3580, at 736 (1940).
SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 747 (D. Md. 1968).

646

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

the “contemporary legal context” of the legislation.38 It is important to
note that the “contemporary legal context” may only be employed to
“buttress[] a conclusion independently supported by the text of the
statute” and that “[contemporary] legal context matters only to the
extent it clarifies text.”39
At the time the Advisers Act was being debated, there was no
regulation of financial service providers outside of registration for
“stockbrokers” who only bought and sold securities.40 As late as 1939,
“little was known about the number of investment advisers operating at
the time or the amount of assets they managed.”41 In a 1934 Harvard
Law Review article, Supreme Court Justice Harlan Stone stated that, “I
venture to assert that when the history of the financial era which has just
drawn to a close comes to be written, most of its mistakes and its major
faults will be ascribed to the failure to observe the fiduciary principle,
the precept as old as holy writ, that ‘a man cannot serve two masters.’”42
Based upon the financial excesses of the 1920’s and the great
market crash of 1929, Congress passed multiple financial services bills
in the early to mid-1930’s. One of those bills, The Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935, authorized the SEC “to make a study of
the functions and activities of investment trusts and investment
companies.”43 The study reflected that “investment advisers could not
‘completely perform their basic function—furnishing to clients on a
personal basis competent, unbiased, and continuous advice regarding the
sound management of their investments—unless all conflicts of interest
between the investment counsel and the client were removed.’”44
Congress subsequently held hearings to elicit testimony on the issue of
investment adviser registration.

38.
39.
40.

See, e.g., Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979).
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001).
See Arthur Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers, 65 BUS. LAW. 395, 403 (2010).
41. Id. at 403 (citing H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 2, 8 (1939)).
42. Harlan F. Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1934).
43. Letter from Comptroller Gen. McCarl, GAO, to the Chairman, SEC, 15 Comp.
Gen. 951, 951 (May 2, 1936).
44. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 187 (1963)
(quoting Investment Trusts and Investment Companies, Report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Pursuant to Section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act of 1935, on Investment Counsel, Investment Management, Investment Supervisory,
and Investment Advisory Services, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1940)).
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During the Congressional Hearings on the Advisers Act in 1940,
Congress heard testimony concerning how “[t]he relationship of
investment counsel to his client is essentially a personal one involving
trust and confidence. The investment counselor’s sole function is to
render to his client professional advice concerning the investment of his
funds in a manner appropriate to that client’s needs.”45 The witnesses at
the Senate hearing made clear that investment counselors limited “their
efforts and activities to the study of investment problems from the
investor’s standpoint, not engaging in any other activity, such as security
selling or brokerage.”46
The witness testimony reflects that at the time the Advisers Act was
passed, industry members believed that investment counselors and
brokers operated in completely separate industries. There was no fear,
on the part of the witnesses or Congressional members that the functions
would overlap. The Code of Professional Practice for the Investment
Counsel Association of America (ICAA), predecessor to the current
Investment Adviser Association (IAA), stated that “[i]t is the function of
the profession of investment counsel to render to clients, on a personal
basis, competent, unbiased and continuous advice regarding the sound
management of their investments. An investment counsel firm should
devote its time exclusively to the performance of this function and
services incidental thereto; it should not engage in the business of
security merchandising, brokerage, banking, the publication of financial
services, or acting as custodian of the securities or funds of clients.”47
The legislative history of the Advisers Act reflects that the drafters
recognized that brokers were already subject to a fiduciary duty when
providing investment advice. The legislative record reflects that
Congress reviewed state regulation of financial service providers,
including regulations asserting that “[i]nvestment counsel or advice,
whether by one specializing solely in rendering investment counsel or
advice, or by a dealer or broker, incidental to usual transactions in
securities, shall be strictly on the basis of fiduciary relationship between
the counselor or advisor and the investor or prospective investor.”48 This
knowledge reflects an understanding by members of Congress that by
45.
46.

S. REP. NO. 76-3580, at 719 (1940) (Statement of Alexander Standish).
Id. at 724 (Statement of Dwight C. Rose, President, Investment Counsel
Association of America).
47. Id. at 726 (Code of Professional Practice entered in the record).
48. H.R. Doc. No. 76-477, at 32.
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implementing the Advisers Act, Congress was not removing any
previous fiduciary duty owed by broker-dealers, it was only providing
that those individuals would not have to also register as investment
advisers.
The legislative history reflects that Congress also believed special
compensation to be any other form of remuneration outside of
commissions. In the Senate Report, members opined that brokers would
not have to register as investment advisers when providing investment
advice “insofar as [the] advice is merely incidental to brokerage
transactions for which they receive only brokerage commissions.”49 This
bright-line test was workable under the circumstances when enacted in
1940; however, even though the exclusion made sense in an era when
broker-dealers provided only commission-based transactional services,
the activities and business models have been blurred since the drafting
of the Advisers Act and have rendered this reasoning outdated.50
III. REGULATORY TREATMENT OF BROKER-DEALERS
A. SEC INTERPRETATION: ADVISERS ACT SECTION 202(A)(11)
It is informative to look at how the SEC has interpreted the brokerdealer exemption under the Advisers Act. The SEC is the agency
charged with implementing and enforcing the Advisers Act.51 Therefore,
courts generally have to defer to the SEC’s interpretation if it is
embodied in a rule or regulation that has the force of law.52 The SEC
promulgated a final rule interpreting the broker-dealer exemption;
49.
50.

S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22.
The blurring of the lines was amplified as a result of the SEC’s May 1975
elimination of fixed commission rates on securities transactions. See Exchange Act
Release No. 11203 (Jan. 23, 1975), 40 Fed. Reg. 7394 (Feb. 20, 1975).
51. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(a) (2012) (“The Commission shall have
authority from time to time to make, issue, amend, and rescind such rules and
regulations and such orders as are necessary or appropriate to the exercise of the
functions and powers conferred upon the Commission.”).
52. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) (holding that courts should defer to agency interpretations of such statutes unless
they are unreasonable); see also United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27
(2001) (“[A]dministrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies
for Chevron deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency
generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation
claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”).
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however, the D.C. Circuit Court vacated that rule in 2007.53 The SEC
subsequently promulgated an interpretive rule; however, that rule was
never finalized and does not carry the force of law.54 Because there is no
current final rule with the force of law, courts only consider the SEC’s
rationale for its interpretive value, with no requirement of Chevron
deference.55
1. Solely Incidental
The language of the Advisers Act exempts from the definition of
investment adviser a broker or dealer who provides investment advice
incidental to its broker-dealer business. It is important to note that the
Advisers Act does not define “solely incidental.” In its Investment
Adviser Release No. 1 in September 1940, the SEC stated that the
Advisers Act did not encompass “security dealers whose investment
advice is given solely as an incident of their regular business.”56 The
SEC has interpreted the “solely incidental” provision through the lens
that the exemption amounts to “a recognition that brokers and dealers
commonly give a certain amount of advice to their customers in the
course of their regular business, and that it would be inappropriate to
bring them within the scope of the Investment Advisers Act merely
because of this aspect of their business.”57
In a January 1972 No-Action letter, the SEC provided guidance to a
registered broker-dealer who distributed statistical surveys relating to
securities issued by New Jersey banks to many of its customers, free of
charge.58 The SEC opined that “the reports [are] investment advisory in
nature, and, if Ryan received any special compensation therefor [sic],
Ryan’s registration as an investment adviser would be required.”59 In an
53. Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not To Be Inv. Advisers, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2376, 70 Fed. Reg. 2716, 2726 (Jan. 14, 2005), vacated on other
grounds in Fin. Planning Ass’n. v. SEC, 482 F.3d 481 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
54. Interpretive Rule Under the Advisers Act Affecting Broker-Dealers,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2652, 72 Fed. Reg. 55127 (Sept. 28, 2007)
[hereinafter 2007 SEC Interpretative Rule].
55. Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
56. Investment Company Act Release No. 1, 1940 WL 7439 (Sept. 23, 1940).
57. Op. of Gen. Counsel Relating to Section 202(a)(11)(c) of the Inv. Advisers of
1940, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 2, 1940 WL 975 (Oct. 28, 1940)
[hereinafter SEC IA Release No. 2].
58. John J. Ryan & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1972 WL 12209 (Jan. 26, 1972).
59. Id. at *2.
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April 1972 No-Action letter, the SEC addressed a company that was a
registered broker-dealer that was compensated under a “directed
brokerage” fee arrangement, where “the client agrees to instruct its
investment manager to utilize the services of the Company as a brokerdealer in connection with the purchase or the sale of a portion of the
securities for the client’s portfolio.”60 The SEC opined that the
“exemption provided broker-dealers in Section 202(a)(11)(C) is not
available to the Company because in receiving directed brokerage for its
evaluating services it would not be performing its broker-dealer
activities in a manner which is ‘solely incidental’ to the conduct of its
business as a broker-dealer.”61
In a 1975 interpretive release, the SEC opined that the following
activities may not be solely incidental to the conduct of a brokerdealer’s business: (1) advisory services offered as part of an overall plan
that assesses the financial situation of a customer and formulates a
financial plan; and (2) performance of investment supervisory services
or other investment management services tailored to the specific longterm investment needs of individual clients.62
In its 2007 Interpretative Rule, the SEC defined solely incidental as
“when the advisory services rendered to an account are in connection
with and reasonably related to the brokerage services provided to that
account.”63 The Interpretive Release provided two situations where
advice would not be solely incidental to a brokerage business: separate
contract or fee for advisory services and discretionary investment
advice. The SEC found that “a broker-dealer that separately contracts
with a customer for, or separately charges a fee for, investment advisory
services cannot be considered to be providing advice that is solely
incidental to its brokerage.”64 The SEC further found that “discretionary
investment advice is not ‘solely incidental to’ the business of a brokerdealer.”65

60.
61.
62.

William Bye Co., SEC No-Acton Letter, 1972 WL 8513 (Apr. 26, 1972).
Id. at *2.
Adoption of Amendments to Rule 206A-1(T) Under the Inv. Advisors Act of
1940 Extending the Duration & Limiting the Scope of the Temp. Exemption from the
Advisors Act for Certain Brokers & Dealers, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 471,
1975 WL 174562 (Aug. 20, 1975).
63. 2007 SEC Interpretative Rule, supra note 54, at *55127.
64. Id. at *55128.
65. Id.
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The SEC No-Action letters and interpretive guidance reflect that
the SEC, until recently, had a narrow view of when broker-dealers could
legitimately rely on the “solely incidental” exemption. Based upon
changing business models and a strong lobbying effort from the
industry, the SEC has expanded its view of the “solely incidental”
exemption to include almost all brokers providing investment advice,
except for those who have discretionary power over a client’s account.
2. Special Compensation
The language of the Advisers Act exempts from the definition of
investment adviser a broker or dealer who does not receive special
compensation for the provision of investment advice. It is important to
note that the Advisers Act does not define “special compensation.” The
SEC has found a “clear recognition that a broker or dealer who is
specially compensated for the rendition of advice should be considered
an investment adviser and not be excluded from the purview of the Act
merely because he is also engaged in effecting market transactions in
securities.”66 The SEC further stated that “[t]he essential distinction to
be borne in mind . . . is the distinction between compensation for advice
itself and compensation for services of another character to which
advice is merely incidental.”67
In its Investment Adviser Act Release No. 626 in 1975, the SEC
stated that “special compensation” for investment advice is
“compensation to the broker-dealer in excess of that which he would be
paid for providing a brokerage or dealer service alone.”68 The SEC
further stated that special compensation only exists where there is a
clearly definable charge for investment advice and that “a client who
perceives that he is paying a charge specifically for investment advice is
entitled to the protection of the Advisers Act.”69
In an April 1985 letter, the SEC shed light on what they believed
constituted “special compensation.”70 Their belief was that the
66.
67.
68.

SEC IA Release No. 2, supra note 57, at *2.
Id.
Final Extension of Temp. Exemption from the Inv. Advisors Act for Certain
Brokers & Dealers, Investment Advisors Act Release No. 626, 43 Fed. Reg. 19224,
19226 (May 4, 1978) [hereinafter IA Release No. 626].
69. Id.
70. Am. Capital Fin. Servs., SEC No-Action Letter, 1985 WL 54220 (Apr. 29,
1985).
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“qualifying term ‘special’ in the broker-dealer exemption clearly
indicates that Congress was concerned with compensation other than
that received by a broker-dealer in the ordinary course of its brokerage
activities, i.e., commissions.”71 The SEC believed “the essential
distinction between a commission which includes special compensation
and one which does not is whether the [registered representative of a
broker-dealer] is being specifically compensated for investment advice
itself or for brokerage or other services to which the advice is merely
incidental.”72 “It is evident from the discussion above that determining
whether [a registered representative] (or its firm) is being compensated
in any particular case for investment advice or for brokerage or other
services is an inherently factual determination.”73 The SEC made clear
that
a non-segregated charge is special compensation because . . . that
phrase includes any clearly definable charge for investment advice,
regardless of whether the charge is separate from or included within
commissions. If we did not follow this interpretation, [a brokerdealer] could circumvent Congress’ intent to exclude from the Act
only a broker-dealer receiving bona fide commissions by merely
74
incorporating an advisory charge into commissions.

This letter is important, because it reflects the SEC’s view that
broker-dealers can still be required to register as investment advisers
even if they only charge commissions.
Another obstacle when determining whether the financial service
provider is being paid “special compensation” is that many financial
service providers obfuscate their compensation structures. This can be
seen clearly in a North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) survey from 2012, which found that broker-dealers put the
onus on consumers to discover when they are acting in a fiduciary
capacity and how they are compensated, rather than providing that
information up-front in an easily accessible manner.75 For the consumer
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *3.
See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, BROKER-DEALER FEE SURVEY 2 (2012),
available at http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NASAA-Fee-Survey-424-14.pdf (finding that “[w]hile broker-dealers may comply with the technical
requirements governing fee disclosures, their disclosures lose effectiveness when
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perspective, a 2012 study of 7,500 U.S. households by Cerulli
Associates,76 in conjunction with Phoenix Marketing International,
found that nearly two-thirds of investors either believed the advice was
free (29 percent) or did not understand how the financial service
provider was paid (31 percent).77 This empirical evidence reflects that
consumers are often unclear on how their financial service providers are
compensated. Until compensation disclosure is made more transparent
to consumers, gathering evidence to support the “special compensation”
prong of the exemption will be an almost insurmountable obstacle.
B. SEC AND NASD / FINRA ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS - BROKERDEALERS ARE FIDUCIARIES WHEN PROVIDING PERSONALIZED
INVESTMENT ADVICE
The record reflects that the agencies that have enforcement power
over brokers have historically found brokers to have fiduciary
responsibilities. This analysis is important, because under the current
regulatory regime, brokers are judged by a “suitability” standard of care,
which is, under the law, a lower standard of care than a fiduciary
standard.78
The SEC has historically viewed brokers-dealers as fiduciaries that
occupy a position of trust with a client. As far back as 1935,
interestingly five years before enactment of the Advisers Act, the SEC
held that “[t]he fiduciary obligation which a broker owes to his customer
is dealt with in the rules.”79 The SEC has viewed brokers who provide
personalized investment advice differently than those who just take
orders from clients.
In In re Allender Co., the SEC held that the advisor occupied a
position as a fiduciary and found that “[t]he conduct of the customers,
too, was based on their expectation that [the advisor] would act in their
hidden in small print, embedded in lengthy account opening documents, or vague in
terminology that does not define the service provided”).
76. A leading research firm that specializes in data collection related to the
financial services industry.
77. Cerulli Quantitative Update: Retail Investor Advice Relationships 2012,
CERULLI ASSOCIATES (2012), at 224 (on file with author).
78. See FINRA, Rule 2111, Sustainability (2014), http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859.
79. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release No. 179, 1935 WL 29075 (Apr. 17,
1935).
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best interests, an expectation fostered by [the advisor’s] own conduct
and words.”80 In In re William J. Stelmack Corp., the SEC held that “the
very function of furnishing investment counsel, learning the personal
and intimate details of the financial affairs of customers, and making
recommendations as to purchases and sales of securities, constitutes, in
our opinion, a fiduciary function. If a broker, who merely executes a
transaction on a principal’s order, is an agent, it is anomalous to exclude
from that category one whose relationship to a customer is much more
intimate and confidential.”81 In In re Linder, Bilotti & Co., Inc., the SEC
held that the
record contain[ed] overwhelming evidence of serious misconduct,
complete disregard of the financial welfare of customers and the
utter abdication of the fiduciary duties which a broker-dealer owes to
82
his customers.” A “broker’s recommendations must be consistent
with his customer’s best interests” and are “not suitable merely
83
because the customer acquiesces [to them].

The SEC has also viewed brokers as fiduciaries regarding the
disclosure they provide and the fees charged to clients. In In re Russell
L. Irish, the SEC held that “[a] broker-dealer fiduciary’s affirmative
duty to make adequate disclosure under these circumstances is not
satisfied by merely furnishing the customers with a prospectus which
describes the break points.”84 In In re Thomson & McKinnon and Walter
T. O’hara, the SEC “stressed the importance of the broker’s fiduciary
obligation to get the best price for his customers.”85
The important point to note is that throughout these administrative
proceedings, the broker has established a relationship with the customer,
beyond a buyer-seller relationship. This view was confirmed in a 1994
SEC Release, which stated that “[i]n cases where a broker-dealer has
80. In re Allender Co., Exchange Act Release No. 2992, 9 SEC 1043, 1053 (Aug.
27, 1941).
81. In re William J. Stelmack Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 3261, 11 SEC 601,
618 (June 9, 1942).
82. In re Linder, Bilotti & Co., 1964 SEC LEXIS 2329, at *56-57 (Jul. 29, 1964).
83. In re Dane S. Faber, Exchange Act Release No. 49216, 57 SEC 297, 310-11
(Feb. 10, 2004).
84. In re Russell L. Irish, Exchange Act Release No. 7687, 42 SEC 735, n.15 (Aug.
27, 1965).
85. In re Thomson & McKinnon & Walter T. O’Hara, Exchange Act Release No.
8310, 43 SEC 785, at *3 (May 8, 1968).
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established a customer relationship based upon trust and confidence, and
the customer depends upon and follows the broker-dealer’s advice, a
fiduciary relationship is established between the broker-dealer and
customer.”86 The enforcement proceedings and regulatory releases cited
above reflect that the SEC has held brokers to a fiduciary standard of
care when providing more than mere transactional assistance.
Additionally, even though FINRA generally only holds brokers to a
lower “suitability” standard of care, the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD), which was the precursor to FINRA,
historically viewed brokers as fiduciaries that occupied a position of
trust with the client. In June 1940, over 70 years ago, the NASD stated
that “a broker or agent is a fiduciary and he thus stands in a position of
trust or confidence with respect to his customer or principal . . . . The
law will not permit a broker or agent to put himself in a position where
he can be influenced by any considerations other than those to the best
interests of his customer or principal.”87 Further, recent FINRA
pronouncements have provided for a “suitability” standard that
increasingly looks like a fiduciary standard of care.88 The new FINRA
suitability rule89 contemplates evaluating broker-dealer conduct in the
context of the kind of comprehensive, ongoing advisory relationship
with customers that is more akin to a fiduciary relationship. FINRA
expanded the suitability rule to cover not only recommendations, but
also “investment strategies,” which include situations in which a
security or strategy is recommended, regardless of whether a transaction
takes place.90
FINRA’s January 2011 guidance on the new suitability rule states
that the broker-dealer must “know its customers not only at account
86. Confirmation of Transactions, Exchange Act Release No. 34–33743, 56 SEC
Docket 558, n.48 (Mar. 9, 1994).
87. Questions and Answer, N.A.S.D. NEWS (NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS, INC.), June 22, 1940, at 2.
88. Dep’t of Enforcement v. Bendetsen, Complaint No. C01020025, 2004 NASD
Discip. LEXIS 13, at *12 (Aug. 9, 2004) (“[A] broker’s recommendations must serve
his client’s best interests and the test for whether a broker’s recommendations are
suitable is not whether the client acquiesced in them, but whether the broker’s
recommendations were consistent with the client’s financial situation and needs.”).
89. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, Exchange Act Release No. 34-63325,
75 Fed. Reg. 71479 (Nov. 23, 2010) (SEC release approving FINRA Rule 2111,
effective July 9, 2012).
90. FINRA, Regulatory Notice 12-25, Suitability: Additional Guidance on
FINRA’s New Suitability Rule (2012).
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opening but also throughout the life of its relationship with customers in
order to, among other things, effectively service and supervise the
customers’ accounts.”91 This new suitability rule moves the rule closer
to a fiduciary rule and should ease broker-dealers’ transition to any
newly promulgated uniform fiduciary standard. For example, FINRA
Rule 2111 (suitability) requires firms and associated persons to seek to
obtain information about the customer’s:
age; other investments; financial situation and needs, which might
include questions about annual income and liquid net worth; tax
status, such as marginal tax rate; investment objectives, which might
include generating income, funding retirement, buying a home,
preserving wealth or market speculation; investment experience;
investment time horizon, such as the expected time available to
achieve a particular financial goal; liquidity needs, which is the
customer’s need to convert investments to cash without incurring
significant loss in value; and risk tolerance, which is a customer’s
willingness to risk losing some or all of the original investment in
92
exchange for greater potential returns.

Recently, in its 2015 “Exam Priorities Letter”, FINRA stated that
“[i]rrespective of whether a firm must meet a suitability or fiduciary
standard, FINRA believes that firms best serve their customers—and
reduce their regulatory risk—by putting customers’ interests first. This
requires the firm to align its interests with those of its customers.”93
This movement towards a higher standard of care for brokers
reflects that the transition of providing services under a suitability
standard to a fiduciary duty will not be an insurmountable obstacle and
in fact may be the de facto standard required, regardless of the legal
standard applied.

91. FINRA, Regulatory Notice 11-02, Know Your Customer and Suitability: SEC
Approves Consolidated FINRA Rules Governing Know-Your-Customer and Suitability
Obligations, n.5 (2011).
92. Suitability: What Investors Need to Know, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/
Investors/ProtectYourself/BeforeYouInvest/P197434.
93. Regulatory and Examinations Priorities Letter, FINRA (Jan. 6, 2015), available
at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@guide/documents/industry/
p602239.pdf.
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C. FINRA ARBITRATION – BROKER-DEALERS SUED FOR BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTIES
In addition to the recent FINRA pronouncements of a quasifiduciary duty for broker-dealers, the empirical data provides that
broker-dealers are subjected to fiduciary claims in private securities
arbitration. Broker-dealers are not regulated under the Advisers Act,
therefore, they are generally not subject to a fiduciary standard of care.94
However, since 2010, there have been over 11,000 claims brought
against broker-dealers for violation of a fiduciary standard of care.95 The
empirical data reflects that a majority of clients believe that their brokerdealers owe them a fiduciary standard of care and are alleging a
violation of that duty through the arbitration process. It will be difficult
for the brokerage industry to argue that they are not subject to a
fiduciary standard of care when a violation of that duty is the most
frequently brought claim against its members in securities arbitration.
The empirical data also explains the dearth of case law regarding
broker-dealers’ fiduciary standard of care. As noted by this Author is a
previous article, “[a]n overwhelming majority of retail brokerage and
many investment advisory agreements include language requiring that
all disputes between the customer and the broker-dealer/investment
adviser be resolved through arbitration.”96

94. SEC STAFF, STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS: AS
REQUIRED BY SECTION 913 OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (Jan. 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/
913studyfinal.pdf [hereinafter SEC Staff Study].
95. Dispute
Resolution
Statistics,
FINRA
http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/ind
ex.htm.
96. William Alan Nelson, Take It or Leave It: Unconscionability of Mandatory
Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements in the Securities Industry, 17 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 573,
574 (2015) (citing Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, SEC, Speech before the Annual
NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference: Outmanned and Outgunned: Fighting on Behalf of
Investors Despite Efforts to Weaken Investor Protections (Apr. 16, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515400#.UfmMlZWdzdk
(“Currently, almost all customer agreements with brokerage firms include an arbitration
clause requiring customers to arbitrate their claims in an arbitration forum—and they’re
now popping-up in the investment advisory industry.”)).
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D. MUNICIPAL ADVISORS
Broker-dealers currently have fiduciary duties in certain
circumstances when advising on municipal securities. Section 15B of
the Exchange Act, as amended by the Dodd-Frank Act, granted the
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) regulatory authority
over municipal advisors and imposes a fiduciary duty on municipal
advisors when advising municipal entities.97 In recent guidance, the SEC
makes clear that “[i]f a broker-dealer acts as a municipal advisor to a
municipal entity with respect to an issuance of municipal securities, it
owes a fiduciary duty to the municipal entity with respect to that issue
and must not take any action inconsistent with its fiduciary duty to the
municipal entity.”98 The SEC also stated that “broker-dealer[s] must
comply with MSRB Rule G-23, which prohibits persons from switching
from the role of financial advisor to the role of underwriter with respect
to the same issuance of municipal securities.”99 This can be analogized
to the “hat-switching” and regulatory arbitrage issues discussed below.
Essentially, a broker-dealer who is a registered municipal advisor must
choose either to give advice to a government client as an adviser and
follow strict fiduciary guidelines, or to act as an underwriter and have a
lower duty of care with regard to his or her municipal client.
E. ERISA
An increasingly significant portion of the assets managed by
brokers-dealers belongs to employee benefit and pension plans subject
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(“ERISA”).100 ERISA is a Federal law that sets standards of protection
for individuals in most voluntarily established, private-sector retirement
97. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(c) (2012). Exchange Act Section 15B(c)(1) provides that:
“A municipal advisor and any person associated with such municipal advisor shall be
deemed to have a fiduciary duty to any municipal entity for whom such municipal
advisor acts as a municipal advisor, and no municipal advisor may engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which is not consistent with a municipal advisor’s
fiduciary duty or that is in contravention of any rule of the Board.” 15 U.S.C. § 78o4(c)(1).
98. Registration of Municipal Advisors: Frequently Asked Questions, SEC OFFICE
OF MUNICIPAL SECURITIES (May 19, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/info/municipal/munadvisors-faqs.pdf.
99. Id. at 19.
100. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified in part at 29 U.S.C. ch. 18).
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plans. When debating ERISA, Congress found that employee benefit
plans required greater protection because the “continued well-being and
security of millions of employees and their dependents are directly
affected by these plans.”101 Specifically, ERISA seeks to protect
employees “by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility and
obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans.”102
In general, there are two main categories of pension plans—defined
benefit plans and defined contribution plans . . . . Defined benefit
plans are generally funded by the employer, guaranteeing a specified
monthly or other periodic retirement benefit to the employee based
on the employee’s age, salary, and/or years of service . . . . Defined
contribution plans, also called individual account plans, may be
funded by employers, employees or both. Employee contributions
may be on an after-tax basis, or in the case of a “401(k) plan” (and
other plans such as 403(b) and 457(b) plans), on a pre-tax basis.
These plans often permit employees to select their own investment
103
choices, generally from a prescribed menu of options.

Many financial intermediaries manage assets for pension plans.
Brokers must be aware that “ERISA is an extremely complex piece of
legislation that deals with the establishment, operation, and
administration of pension plans and is designed to protect plan
participants and beneficiaries from certain potential abuses.”104 Brokerdealers need to exercise particular care when managing assets subject to
ERISA, as it imposes high fiduciary standards of conduct on those who
operate and manage plans, including those who provide brokerage and
related services to plans.105
IV. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF BROKERS
A. COMMON LAW: FUNCTION OVER FORM
Based upon the cases and enforcement proceedings above, courts
and regulators look to the substance of the relationship rather than
relying on titles to discern fiduciary responsibility. Historically,
101.
102.
103.

29 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
19 THOMAS P. LEMKE & GERALD T. LINS, REGULATION
PLANNERS § 3:494 (West 2013).
104. Id.
105. Id.
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regardless of whether an individual described themselves as an
investment adviser, investment consultant, financial advisor, financial
planner, broker or dealer, the courts and regulators have looked to what
services they were providing and also how the client perceived those
services. This is an important distinction that many opponents of a
uniform fiduciary standard seem to ignore.
The enforcement proceedings cited above also reflect how narrowly
the SEC viewed the “solely incidental” exemption for brokers under the
Advisers Act. These proceedings reflect that once the broker goes
beyond just buying and selling securities and furnishes investment
counsel and learns the personal and intimate details of the financial
affairs of customers, they are acting in a fiduciary capacity.
Conflicting standards of care have arisen, in part, due to each
branch of the financial services industry being regulated separately.
Scandals involving Madoff Investment Securities, the Stanford Financial
Group, and other Ponzi schemes have confirmed doubts over the murky
demarcation among brokerage, dealing and advisory services.106 This
blurring of the lines is readily apparent in the case law. Because there is
no uniform standard of care for broker-dealers and investment advisors,
courts have differing views on when a fiduciary duty is owed. A review
of authorities shows division within the courts regarding the fiduciary
duties of broker-dealers. This division arises, because the application of
the fiduciary duty at common law, as noted above, depends on the actual
financial sophistication of the client or the specific communications
between the financial service provider and the client.
It is important to note that not all common law and state securities
laws are preempted by Federal securities laws and regulations. In Baker,
Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, the Fourth Circuit held that “[i]t is
well-settled that federal law does not enjoy complete preemptive force
in the field of securities . . . . State securities laws exist in every state,
the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and, ‘far from preempting the
field,’ Congress has expressly preserved the role of the states in
securities regulation.”107 The court further held that “states enjoy broad
powers to regulate such diverse subjects as: the registration of securities;
106. See FINRA SPECIAL REVIEW COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE 2009 SPECIAL
REVIEW COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE STANFORD
AND MADOFF SCHEMES (Sept. 2009), http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/
@corp/documents/corporate/p120078.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
107. Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 876 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir.
1989).
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the registration of broker-dealers, agents, and investment advisers; and
fraud in the sale or purchase of securities and the rendering of
investment advisory services.”108 The court also stated that States also
“may provide additional rights and remedies which do not conflict with
federal securities law.”109
Additionally, a financial advisor may be liable for breach of
fiduciary duty even though no violation of federal or state securities
laws is found. Because there is no preemption of state securities laws,
even though a financial advisor is only registered as a broker-dealer, he
or she still may face fiduciary liability under common law. In
Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that:
Since not every instance of financial unfairness or breach of
fiduciary duty will constitute a fraudulent activity under § 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5, federal courts should be wary of foreclosing common
law breach of fiduciary duty actions which supplement existing
federal or state statutes . . . . The fiduciary concept derives from trust
and agency principles. Actions contrary to the duties of loyalty and
care are remedied by giving the beneficiary of the relationship the
110
right to recover for the fiduciary’s breach.

1. Generally
When analyzing whether a fiduciary duty exists, courts and
regulators look to the substance of the relationship rather than relying on
titles to discern fiduciary responsibility. It is informative to look at
examples of cases throughout the country where the fiduciary duty was
at issue. A number of courts have found that brokers are held to be
fiduciaries for provision of investment advice given on a regular basis;
when investors rely on brokers’ fraudulent misrepresentations; or when
there is a “special” relationship between the broker and customer,
generally defined by unequal bargaining power and trust and confidence
placed in the broker by the customer.111
108.
109.

Id.
Id. (citing Underhill Assocs., Inc. v. Bradshaw, 674 F.2d 293, 295-96 (4th Cir.

1982)).
110. Gochnauer v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 810 F.2d 1042, 1049 (11th Cir.
1987).
111. See, e.g., Daniels v. Nat’l Emp. Benefit Servs., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 684, 690
(N.D. Ohio 1994) (“The term ‘fiduciary’ is to be given a broad construction … an
individual is to be considered a fiduciary only as to those functions over which he has

662

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XX

As stated by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
New Hampshire in Clarkeies Market, “[a] fiduciary relation does not
depend on some technical relation created by or defined in law . . . . It
may exist under a variety of circumstances and does exist in cases where
there has been a special confidence placed in one who, in equity and
good conscience, is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the
interests of the one reposing the confidence.”112 Additionally, in ARA
Automotive Group v. Central Garage, the Fifth Circuit held that “[a]
fiduciary relationship may arise from a variety of relationships where
the parties are ‘under a duty to act for or give advice for the benefit of
another upon matters within the scope of their relation.’”113 The court
further noted that the “existence of a fiduciary relationship, outside of
formal relationships that automatically give rise to fiduciary duties, is
usually a fact intensive inquiry.”114
a. Brokers With No Fiduciary Obligations
Courts have generally found that brokers do not have fiduciary
obligations when providing purely transactional assistance. In Farm
King Supply, Inc. Integrated Profit Sharing Plan v. Edward D. Jones &
Co., the defendant was held to not be a fiduciary. Even though Jones
selected a few securities from its limited pool of commissionable
securities and proposed to the trustees that they should purchase from
among this select group, the court found he was only acting as a
broker.115 Courts in other jurisdictions have also found that the “mere

discretionary control or authority, whether that authority be conferred de facto or
pursuant to agreement.”); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F.
Supp. 951, 954 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981) (“[I]f the broker
is socially or personally involved with the customer, the courts are likely to conclude
that the customer relinquished control because of the relationship of trust and
confidence.”).
112. In re Clarkeies Mkt., LLC, 322 B.R. 487, 495 (Bankr. N.H. 2005) (quoting
Lash v. Cheshire Cnty. Sav. Bank, 124 N.H. 435, 439 (1984)); see also SEC v.
Ridenour, 913 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1990) (broker-dealer owed fiduciary duty to clients
with whom he had established a relationship of trust and confidence).
113. ARA Auto. Grp. v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 124 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1997).
114. Id.
115. Farm King Supply, Inc. Integrated Profit Sharing Plan v. Edward D. Jones &
Co., 884 F.2d 288, 294-95 (7th Cir. 1989).
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existence of a broker-customer relationship is not proof of its fiduciary
character.”116
In Independent Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc., the Second Circuit held that “there is no general fiduciary duty
inherent in an ordinary broker/customer relationship.”117 In Press v.
Chemical Investment Services. Corp., the Second Circuit held that a
broker-customer relationship is not ordinarily a fiduciary relationship
and that a broker’s fiduciary obligation, if any, is generally limited to
completion of the transaction.118 The court went on to state that even in
“[c]ases that have recognized the fiduciary relationship as evolving
simply from the broker-client relationship have limited the scope of the
fiduciary duty to the narrow task of consummating the transaction
requested.”119
In Arst v. Stifel Nicolaus & Co., the Tenth Circuit held that the
broker did not have a fiduciary duty to investigate or disclose
information about securities a customer wanted to sell.120 In Sewell v.
Great North Insurance Co., the Tenth Circuit held that “absent a special
relationship between the insured and the insurer’s agent, that agent has
no affirmative duty to advise or warn his or her customer of provisions
contained in an insurance policy.”121
b. Brokers With Fiduciary Obligations
A majority of courts have found that when brokers are providing
anything other than purely transactional assistance, they owe a fiduciary
duty to their clients. In Maybank v. BB&T Corp., the court held the
agent to a fiduciary duty because the client engaged the agent to devise a
retirement investment plan that reflected the client’s goals of
diversification, steady income, tax sheltering, and ability to protect

116. See, e.g., Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 681 F. Supp. 1045, 1055 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (quoting Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 1974)).
117. Indep. Order of Foresters v. Donald, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc. 157 F.3d 933, 940
(2d Cir. 1998).
118. Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999).
119. Id.
120. Arst v. Stifel Nicolaus & Co., 871 F. Supp. 1370, 1384 (D. Kan. 1994), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 86 F.3d 973 (10th Cir. 1996).
121. Sewell v. Great N. Ins. Co., 535 F.3d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir. 2008).
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wealth for heirs.122 In Tonzi v. Nichols, the court found a fiduciary
relationship existed because the defendant, who was the client’s
accountant and financial advisor for over twenty years, advised him to
roll over his 401(k) and invest in viatical contracts.123
Courts will look at both the sophistication of the investor and the
level of trust and confidence placed in the broker-dealer. In Belmont v.
MB Investment Partners, the Third Circuit held that “a plaintiff alleging
a fiduciary breach must first demonstrate that a fiduciary or confidential
relationship existed . . . a fiduciary relationship does not exist merely
because one party receives, or even relies on advice from another, but
rather requires that ‘the parties do not deal with each other on equal
terms.’”124 In MidAmerica Federal Savings and Loan Association v.
Shearson/Am. Express Inc., the Tenth Circuit held that “a fiduciary
relationship springs from an attitude of trust and confidence and is based
on some form of agreement, either expressed or implied, from which it
can be said the minds have been met to create a mutual obligation.”125 In
Lee v. Hasson, a Texas Court of Appeals found that the “facts of [the]
case present a rare example of the type of close personal relationship of
trust and confidence that gives rise to a legally cognizable fiduciary
duty.”126
In Mathias v. Rosser, Mathias advised Rosser to invest money in
three nursing homes he owned.127 The Court found that “the evidence
established that Rosser was a licensed stockbroker and held himself out
as a financial advisor, and that plaintiff was an unsophisticated investor
who sought investment advice from Rosser precisely because of his
alleged expertise as a broker and investment advisor. Further, Rosser
testified that plaintiff had relied upon his experience, knowledge, and

122. Maybank v. BB&T Corp., No. 6:12-cv-00214-JMC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
108480, at *7-12 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2012).
123. Tonzi v. Nichols, 899 N.Y.S.2d 63, slip op. 51924(U) at *2-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2009).
124. Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 506 n.44 (3d Cir. 2013)
(quoting In re Estate of Clark, 359 A.2d 777, 781 (Pa. 1976)).
125. MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Ex. Inc., 886 F.2d 1249,
1257 (10th Cir. 1989).
126. Lee v. Hasson, 286 S.W.3d 1, 19 (Tex. Civ. App. 2007).
127. Mathias v. Rosser, Nos. 01AP-768, 01AP-770, 2002 WL 1066937, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. 2002).

2015]

BROKER-DEALER:
A FIDUCIARY BY ANY OTHER NAME?

665

expertise in seeking his advice.”128 Based upon these facts, the court
found a fiduciary relationship existed between Mathias and Rosser.129
In Nat’l Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litig., the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of California noted that under
California law, an insurer does not owe a strict fiduciary duty to its
insured.130 However, because the sales agents held themselves out as
objective financial planners, the court found that a special relationship,
fiduciary in nature, was created between Plaintiffs and Defendants.131
The court also stated that the deferred annuities being offered were
“complex financial instruments which the average person cannot
understand.”132 In Johnson v. John Hancock Funds, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals held that
[i]f the transaction is non-discretionary and at arm’s length, i.e., a
simple order to buy or sell a particular stock, the relationship does
not give rise to general fiduciary duties . . . . However, if the client
has requested the broker or advisor to provide investment advice or
has given the broker discretion to select his or her investments, the
broker or advisor assumes broad fiduciary obligations that extend
beyond the individual transactions . . . . When a stock broker or
financial advisor is providing financial or investment advice, he or
she is required to exercise the utmost good faith, loyalty, and
133
honesty toward the client.

In Patsos v. First Albany, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found
that the broker owed a fiduciary duty to the client who lacked
investment acumen, because a naïve client is more likely to place special
trust in the broker.134
The courts will also look at the relationship of the broker and the
customer outside of the financial service being provided. In Kalb v.
Norsworthy, a Texas Court of Appeals found a fiduciary relationship
128.
129.
130.

Id. at *5.
Id.
In re Nat’l W. Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1086
(S.D. Cal. 2006).
131. Id. at 1087.
132. Id.; see also Estate of Migliaccio, 436 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(“[A] deferred annuity is not merely a life insurance policy but a ‘complex investment
product’ which requires a purchaser to rely on the agent for superior knowledge.”).
133. Johnson v. John Hancock Funds, 217 S.W.3d 414, 428-29 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006).
134. See Patsos v. First Albany Corp., 741 N.E.2d 841 (Mass. 2001).
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where, “[b]y reason of appellant’s long association with appellee in a
business relationship, as well as the close personal friendship existing
between them, appellant was justified in placing confidence in the belief
that appellee would act in his best interest.”135 In Leib v. Merrill Lynch,
the Eastern District of Michigan held that “if the broker is socially or
personally involved with the customer, the courts are likely to conclude
that the customer relinquished control because of the relationship of
trust and confidence.”136 This is an important point, when one considers
the multitude of financial services advertising where financial service
providers profess to be our “neighbors and friends.”
In Burdett v. Miller, the Seventh Circuit held that “if a person
solicits another to trust him in matters for which he holds himself out as
expert and trustworthy, and if the other, who is not an expert, accepts the
offer and reposes her trust in the first, a fiduciary relationship is
established.”137 In EBCI Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., the New York
Court of Appeals held that, when an arm’s length relationship becomes
advisory and one person was induced to and did repose confidence in
another, the relationship becomes fiduciary.138 In United States v.
Williams, a self-employed insurance seller took advantage of his
position as a financial advisor to gain the trust of an 87-year-old man
and convinced him to grant power of attorney, with which the financial
planner stole about $400,000.139 The court held that the financial advisor
was employed as a fiduciary, specifically noting that the elderly man
relied upon the fiduciary as his trusted advisor.140 In Hatleberg v.
Norwest Bank Wisconsin, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that when
a broker holds himself or herself out as either an “investment planner,”
“financial planner,” or “financial advisor,” a fiduciary duty may arise.141
The above cited cases reflect that courts look to the nature of the
product or services being delivered, the manner in which the financial

135.
136.

Kalb v. Norsworthy, 428 S.W.2d 701, 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 954
(E.D. Mich. 1978).
137. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992).
138. EBCI Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2005).
139. United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 724 (9th Cir. 2006).
140. Id.
141. Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wisconsin, 700 N.W.2d 15 (Wisc. 2005).
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service providers hold themselves out and clients’ perceptions to
determine whether the financial service provider is a fiduciary.142
Even though a majority of courts have held that, under common
law, brokers are fiduciaries when providing personalized investment
advice or holding themselves out as trusted advisors, a minority of
courts have followed the SEC’s expansive view of when advice is
“solely incidental” to a broker’s practice. For example, in Thomas v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., the plaintiffs purchased a Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company (“Met Life”) variable universal life insurance
policy, based upon the advice of their registered representative, an
employee of Met Life’s affiliated broker-dealer, Metropolitan Securities,
Inc.143 The court held that the broker-dealer exemption rendered the
fiduciary standard inapplicable to Met Life and its affiliated brokerdealer, because Met Life’s investment adviser service was “solely
incidental to” its brokerage function.144 The court reasoned that “solely
incidental to” meant “solely in connection with” and it was undisputed
that the registered representative’s advice was solely connected to the
plaintiff’s purchase of the insurance policy.145 Even though the court
found that “[w]here the product being sold is a sophisticated financial
product . . . it would seem that the need for unbiased advice—or at least
for the disclosure of those things that might tend to skew the salesman’s
‘advice’—would seem to be every bit as great as in a conventional
advisory relationship,” the court still held that the broker-dealer
exemption applied.146
It is important to note that the Thomas case is in the minority and,
more importantly, directly contradicts the Congressional intent
underlying the enactment of the Advisers Act.147 As reflected in the
discussion above, a majority of courts view brokers as fiduciaries when
142. But see Noveletsky v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83762, at
*7 n.13 (D. Me. June 14, 2013) (The financial service provider “admitted in his
deposition that he provided wealth, estate, and insurance planning for Noveletsky . . . .
[He] also stated that he did not provide financial planning services to Noveletsky. . . .
Noveletsky provides no authority for the proposition that fiduciary duties may attach to
someone providing wealth, estate, or insurance planning.”).
143. Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-07-0121-F, 2009 WL 2778663, at *2
(W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2009).
144. Id. at *3.
145. Id. at *7.
146. Id. at *9.
147. See supra Part II.B.
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providing personalized advice to customers or holding themselves out as
trusted advisors.148
2. Commissions and Principal Trading
The areas of commissions and principal trading are hot-button
issues and are also areas where the courts and regulators have put
function over form. These are the two oft-cited arguments put forth by
opponents of a uniform fiduciary standard of care, namely that under
such a standard, they will not be allowed to receive commissions or
trade as a principal. This Author respectfully disagrees and provides
below that the regulatory agencies do as well.
It is important to note that Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act
states that, under any newly implemented uniform fiduciary standard of
care, commission-based products will not, in and of themselves, violate
the uniform fiduciary standard of conduct.149 These products will be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis under a principles-based “best
interest” fiduciary standard.150
The courts can look to the standard currently employed by
regulators concerning commission-based advice and products that, in
some situations, may be in the best interest of the customer. A good
example where commission-based products may be in the best interest
of the client is in a “reverse churning” situation. Reverse churning
occurs when “compensation is based upon the amount of assets in the
account and trades are uncompensated, which often leads to undertrading or an account being ignored altogether.”151
In In re A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., the New York Stock Exchange,
LLC (“NYSE”) Division of Enforcement found that there were
148.
149.

See supra Part III.B.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 913, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824-30 (2010).
150. Melanie Waddell, SEC Chief White Backs Fiduciary Rule for Brokers,
THINKADVISOR (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/03/17/sec-chiefwhite-backs-fiduciary-rule-for-brokers (quoting SEC Chair Mary Jo White as stating
that “‘the SEC should act under Section 913 of Dodd-Frank to implement a uniform
fiduciary duty for broker-dealers and investment advisors’ where the standard is to act
in the best interest of clients when giving advice to retail investors”).
151. Robert A. Prentice, Moral Equilibrium: Stock Brokers and the Limits of
Disclosure, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1059, 1067 n.31 (2011) (citing Arthur B. Laby,
Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV.
701, 740 (2010)).
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numerous non-managed fee-in-lieu of commission customer accounts
that had “zero trades in either two consecutive years, three consecutive
years, or in some instances, four consecutive years.”152 Such customers
paid substantially more in fees than they would have had they been
paying on a commission basis.153 In In re Raymond James & Associates,
Inc., the NYSE Division of Enforcement found that between April 2001
and December 2004, Raymond James recommended to, and opened for,
customers fee-based accounts without properly determining whether the
account structure was suitable; of the nearly 3,000 Raymond James
customers who opened fee-based accounts, almost 200 never traded at
all, yet paid aggregate fees of $138,000.154 Raymond James also was
found to have used advertising and sales literature that emphasized the
benefits of fee-based accounts without adequately discussing their fees
and restrictions.155
In In re Morgan Stanley DW, Inc., the NYSE Division of
Enforcement found that the firm failed to create and maintain a
supervisory system to ensure that fee-based accounts continued to be
suitable for its customers who held such accounts; and as a result,
between January 2001 and December 2003, more than 3,500 customers
maintained fee-based accounts (with a minimum annual fee of $1,000),
despite the fact that they conducted no trades in their accounts for two
consecutive years and/or maintained assets less than $25,000 for at least
one year.156 In February 2009, FINRA fined Robert W. Baird & Co.
$500,000 for fee-based account violations.157 FINRA found that the
company allowed numerous customers to remain in fee-based accounts

152. In re A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 2006 NYSE Disc. Action LEXIS 143, at *1112 (Jul. 10, 2006).
153. Id. at *9-14.
154. In re Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 2005 NASD LEXIS 11, at *71-73 (May
1, 2005).
155. Id. at *75.
156. See NASD Orders Morgan Stanley to Pay Over $6.1 Million for Fee-Based
Account Violations, FINRA (Aug. 2, 2005), available at http://www.finra.org/
newsroom/2005/nasd-orders-morgan-stanley-pay-over-61-million-fee-based-accountviolations (last visited Apr. 13, 2015).
157. See FINRA Fines Robert W. Baird & Co. $500,000 for Fee-Based Account,
Breakpoint Violations, FINRA (Feb. 18, 2009), available at https://www.finra.org/
newsroom/2009/finra-fines-robert-w-baird-co-500000-fee-based-account-breakpointviolations (last visited Apr. 27, 2015).
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despite conducting no trades for at least eight consecutive quarters; these
accounts paid over $269,000 in fees during the inactive quarters.158
These enforcement actions reflect that the compensation structure
employed by a financial service provider should be based upon the best
interest of the customer, rather than a strict adherence to a single form of
compensation. This Author is not suggesting that financial service
providers may use this argument as a strategy to avoid mitigating
conflicts of interest; it just amplifies the fact that financial service
providers must take action in the best interest of the customer, regardless
of the interests of the financial service provider.
The courts can look to the standard currently employed by
regulators, specifically the SEC, concerning principal trading where, in
some situations, it may be in the best interest of the customer. This
Author agrees with the SEC and believes that “[d]epending on the
circumstances, clients may benefit from principal trades, but only in the
context of a fiduciary relationship with the best interests of the client
being paramount . . . . In favorable circumstances, advisers may obtain
access to a broader range of investment opportunities, better trade
execution, and more favorable transaction prices for the securities being
bought or sold than would otherwise be available.”159
Case law and SEC enforcement actions render the distinction as a
“principal” as meaningless for purposes of avoiding a fiduciary duty to
the client. For example, in Opper v. Hancock Securities Corp., the
broker claimed that since he was a “principal,” he did not have any
fiduciary duty towards the client.160 The Southern District Court of New
York (confirmed on appeal by the Second Circuit) held that “the
confirmation-slip label ‘as principal’ or ‘as broker’ was as a practical
matter for defendant’s unilateral determination. Conforming to SEC
requirements, it served only to show whether the broker in the particular
trade had chosen to buy from plaintiff or sell to him for its own account.
While the disclosure served, and serves, as an obviously desirable
protection for the customer, it is equally obvious that the choice of
function in this respect cannot be (and was never intended to be) a
means by which the broker may elect whether or not the law will impose

158.
159.

Id.
Temp. Rule Regarding Principal Trades with Certain Advisory Clients,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-2653, File No. S7-23-07 (Sept. 24, 2007).
160. Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 674 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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fiduciary standards upon him in the actual circumstances of any given
relationship or transaction.”161
Subsequently, the SEC, in In re EF Hutton & Co., relying on the
holding in Opper, found that
[a] broker-dealer’s determination to execute an order as principal or
agent cannot be ‘a means by which the broker may elect whether or
not the law will impose fiduciary standards upon him in the actual
circumstances of any given relationship or transaction.’ Our aim is to
give effect to the reasonable expectations of the parties to the
162
relationship.

Courts have also found that the Advisers Act applies to full-service
broker-dealer firms who provide personalized investment advice to their
customers.163
3. De Facto Discretion and Control
When analyzing the existence and extent of brokers’ fiduciary
obligations, courts have considered the degree of control the broker
exercised over the customer’s account to be a determinative factor.164 In
Adams, the Colorado Supreme Court held that “[i]f a broker has acted as
an investment advisor, and particularly if the customer has almost
invariably followed the broker’s advice, this is an indication that the
broker exercises functional control of the account and that the brokercustomer relationship is fiduciary.”165 In Leboce v. Merrill Lynch, the

161.
162.
163.

Id. at 674-75.
E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 25887, 49 SEC 829, 835 (1988).
Smith v. Oppenheimer Funds Distrib., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 2d 511, 516
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
164. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 516-18
(Colo. 1986).
165. Adams, 718 P.2d at 516 (citing Leboce, S.A. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc., 709 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1983)); Robinson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 107, 113 (N.D. Ala. 1971) (“Where the brokerdealer is also an investment advisor he does occupy a fiduciary relationship”); Hecht v.
Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 433 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (“A degree of control
sufficient to warrant protection may be inferred from evidence that the customer
invariably relied on the dealer’s recommendations, especially when the customer is
relatively naive and unsophisticated”); Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc.,
262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (“The relationship between broker and
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Ninth Circuit held that “it is where the agent ‘for all practical purposes’
controls the account that [the] law imposes fiduciary obligations.”166 In
Davis v. Keyes, the Eastern District of Michigan held that a broker who
assumes effective control over a non-discretionary account owes the
customer fiduciary duties.167 It is important to note here that courts do
not look at the “incidental” nature of the services, they analyze the
interaction between the broker and the customer to determine the level
of control.
An additional “factor in the determination of whether a broker
controls a customer’s account is the financial sophistication of the
customer, since an inexperienced or naive customer is more likely to
leave the control of an account in the broker’s hands.”168 In Beckstrom v.
Parnell, a Louisiana Appellate Court found that the broker should have
known of client’s impairment due to age and alcohol use and although
the client had once been financially sophisticated, the issue was the
client’s “capabilities as an investor at the time [of] the investment
decisions.”169
If a broker is simply taking orders and buying and selling securities,
fiduciary responsibility will generally not be imposed. However, if that
broker provides personalized investment advice to his or her clients and
forms a relationship where the client relies on and trusts that advice,
under common law and principles of stare decisis, a broker will be held
to a fiduciary standard of care.170 Broker-dealers cannot have it both
ways; if they want to be seen as trusted advisors, they must submit to the
obligation of a fiduciary standard of care when providing personalized
investment advice.

principal is fiduciary in nature and imposes on the broker the duty of acting in the
highest good faith toward the principal.”).
166. Leboce, 709 F.2d at 607.
167. See Davis v. Keyes, 859 F. Supp. 290, 294 (E.D. Mich. 1994).
168. Adams, 718 P.2d at 517 (citing Kaufman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 464 F. Supp. 528, 536 (D. Md. 1978); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 954 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Hecht, 283 F. Supp. at
433).
169. Beckstrom v. Parnell, 730 So. 2d 942, 950-52 (La. Ct. App. 1998).
170. See supra Part II.A.
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B. BROKER’S RIGHT TO LIE: THE “PUFFERY DEFENSE”
Even though courts have overwhelmingly found that broker-dealers
who have a special relationship of trust and confidence with the client
are deemed to be fiduciaries, brokers have used the “puffery” defense to
avoid liability. It is important to note that the securities laws do not
recognize a distinct “puffing” exception.171 It is a common law creation
that has been used in the securities, antitrust, torts, contracts, and even
criminal areas of law. For example, the Second Restatement of Torts
states that “loose general statements made by sellers in commending
their wares . . . are commonly known as ‘puffing’ or ‘sales talk.’”172 In
Hoxworth, the Third Circuit held that “[t]o say that a statement is mere
‘puffing’ is, in essence, to say that it is immaterial, either because it is so
exaggerated (‘You cannot lose.’) or so vague (‘This bond is
marvelous.’) that a reasonable investor would not rely on it in
considering the ‘total mix’ of [available] information.”173
It is informative to look at cases where the courts have opined on
the breadth of the “puffery” defense. In Newman v. Rothschild, the
Southern District of New York held that a broker-dealer’s statement that
“I’m the best in the business” was not actionable.174 In Frota v.
Prudential-Bache Securities, the same court held that a broker-dealer’s
assurance that the account would be managed properly and that he was
not only the client’s broker, but their “friend, confidant and financial
advisor” was mere puffery.175
These decisions do seem to conflict with SEC enforcement actions
that seem to take a more narrow view of “puffery.” In In re B.
Fennekohl & Co., the SEC found that the registrant
was engaged in a ‘boiler-room’ operation . . . . The brochures
containing false, misleading and highly optimistic statements
concerning the company were mailed to prospective customers, and .
. . [t]hese salesmen knew of course that no financial information
appeared in the sales literature, and that no reasonable basis was
given for the highly optimistic representations made therein. It

171.
172.
173.

Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200 (3d. Cir. 1990).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 542 (1977).
Hoxworth, 903 F.2d at 200-01 (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426
U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
174. Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, 651 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
175. Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 639 F. Supp. 1186, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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should have been apparent to them that they were participating in a
176
fraudulent, high-pressure sales campaign.

The SEC also found that “[t]he concept of ‘puffing’ is derived from
the doctrine of caveat emptor and . . . can have little application to the
merchandising of securities.”177
With these conflicting views, how does an individual tell whether
they are making material misrepresentations or just “sales” talk? From
an analysis of the above-cited actions, there seems to be a distinction
between quantitative and qualitative information. For example, if the
financial service provider tells the client that his or her rate of return on
a stock will be 8%, when the verifiable information shows it will only be
4%, this would generally be seen as a material misrepresentation.178
However, if the financial service provider simply said that the client
could not lose with the stock or that its value was “red hot,” this would
generally be seen as “puffery” or mere “sales talk.”179
What if the financial service provider informs the client that he is a
trusted advisor and will work in the client’s best interest? Would these
statements be seen as mere “puffery”? In support of this view, the
financial service provider could say that any investor would understand
that these are just aspirational goals and that the investor would not rely
on those representations. However, the counter argument would be that
by informing the client that you will work in his or her best interest
includes a legal obligation to operate as a fiduciary and that an investor
would rely on the representation.
Financial services advertising is important because empirical
evidence reflects that consumers are unaware that there are differences
in the standard of care provided by financial advisors and that some
financial advisors do not have to provide advice and services in their
best interests. For example, a May 2006 survey conducted by TD
Ameritrade surveyed 1,000 U.S. investors concerning the differences in
awareness of investment advice and the protections associated with
stockbrokers and Registered Investment Advisors.180 The study found
that 43% of investors were unaware that stockbrokers and investment
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

In re B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 SEC Docket 210, 216-17 (Sept. 18, 1962).
Id. at 216.
See id.
See Newman, 651 F. Supp. at 163.
TD AMERITRADE INC., TD AMERITRADE INVESTOR PERCEPTION STUDY
(2006), available at http://www.tdainstitutional.com/pdf/InvestorPerceptionStudy.pdf.
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advisors offer different levels of investor protection.181 A January 2008
study conducted by the RAND Center for Corporate Ethics, Law, and
Governance, sponsored by the SEC, found that individual investors were
not aware of the differences between broker-dealers and investment
advisors.182 The study found that “[e]xisting studies suggest that
investors do not have a clear understanding about the distinction
between broker-dealers and investment advisers and their different
levels of fiduciary responsibility.”183
These studies reflect that consumers are either unclear on the duty
owed to them by financial service providers or believe that financial
service providers provide advice in their best interest. Regardless of
which one of these categories the consumer falls under, the
implementation of a uniform fiduciary standard of care would make the
confusion irrelevant and would focus on the harm to consumers, which
arises in part by allowing financial service providers to hold themselves
out as trusted fiduciaries, but then not providing that level of service.184
Informing the client that you will act in his or her best interest goes
beyond “puffing” and “sales talk” and deceives the client into thinking
that they are receiving a level of service that the financial service
provider is not legally obligated to provide. Informing the client that the
broker will work in his or her best interests should legally obligate the
broker to do so (i.e. by providing services under a fiduciary standard of
care).

181.
182.

Id.
Angela Hung et al., Technical Report: Investor and Industry Perspectives on
Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, RAND CORP., (Jan. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/TR556.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2015)
[hereinafter 2008 RAND Study].
183. Id. at 33.
184. Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers
Should be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 770 (2012) (“[A]n adviser that holds
itself out as an expert assumes fiduciary obligations.”). As stated eloquently by prior
SEC Commissioner Elisse B. Walter, “retail investors should not bear the burden of
understanding distinctions between financial professionals that have become
increasingly less relevant over the years.” Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, SEC, Address at
the Mutual Fund Directors Forum: Regulating Broker-Dealers and Investment
Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization? (May 5, 2009), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050509ebw.htm.
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C. DIFFERING PURPOSES AND LEVELS OF PROTECTION: ADVISERS ACT VS.
EXCHANGE ACT
Opponents of a uniform fiduciary duty contend that Advisers Act
precedent should not be applied under any newly created fiduciary duty
imposed on broker-dealers.185 Opponents claim that the Advisers Act
was not meant to regulate brokers.186 This Author agrees wholeheartedly
with the contention; however, once the broker-dealer provides
personalized investment advice to retail customers, they are no longer
providing brokerage services, they are providing investment advisory
services.
The Supreme Court has held that the Advisers Act “was designed
to apply to those persons engaged in the investment-advisory
profession—those who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s
concerns, whether by written or verbal communication.”187 The Court
found the Advisers Act didn’t apply in that case because the
“publications [did] not fit within the central purpose of the Act because
they [did] not offer individualized advice attuned to any specific
portfolio or to any client’s particular needs.”188
Courts have held that the Exchange Act “was intended principally
to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices through
regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-thecounter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on
companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges.”189
This is an important distinction that the courts have provided, mainly
based upon a review of the legislative history leading up to the
Exchange and Advisers Acts. In summary, courts have held that the
purpose of the Exchange Act “is to regulate and control ‘transactions in
securities commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-

185. See Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Director and General
Counsel, SIFMA, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Framework for Rulemaking
under Section 913 (Fiduciary Duty) of the Dodd-Frank Act (July 14, 2011), available at
https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2952.pdf.
186. Id. at 15-16.
187. Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 208 (1985).
188. Id.; see also SEC v. Terry’s Tips, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531 (D. Vt. 2006)
(stating that “[t]he Investment Advisers Act was primarily intended to regulate the
business of rendering personalized investment advice”).
189. See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862, 873 (2d Cir. 1977) (quoting
S. REP. NO. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960)).
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counter markets,’”190 while the purpose of the Advisers Act is “to
protect the public and investors against malpractices by persons paid for
advising others about securities.”191
The Advisers Act also provides greater protections for consumers
than the Exchange Act. It is important to note that this is a long-held
SEC staff opinion. In May 1978, the SEC provided a final extension of a
temporary exemption from the Advisers Act for broker-dealers that
decided, as a result of the May 1975 elimination of fixed commission
rates on securities transactions, to impose charges for their investment
advisory services that might have caused such broker-dealers to lose
their exemption from the Advisers Act.192 In the Release, the SEC
specifically states, “the Advisers Act provides individuals with certain
protections not available under the Exchange Act.”193 The SEC also
stated that “the protections afforded investors under 10b-5 (17 CFR
240.10b-5) the general antifraud rule adopted pursuant to Section 10(b)
(15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)) of the Exchange Act, may not be so broad as those
afforded under the comparable provisions in Section 206 (15 U.S.C.
80b-6) of the Advisers Act.”194
Courts have also held that the suitability obligation does not equate
to a fiduciary “best interest” obligation. In Emerson Electric Co. v.
Marsh & McClellan Co., the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
“[w]hile a broker has a duty to act with reasonable care, skill and
diligence in procuring insurance . . . a broker has no duty to advise the
insured about what insurance he needs or what insurance to buy unless it
specifically undertakes to do so . . . . This Court, therefore, rejects
Emerson’s claim that brokers have an additional duty to find insureds
the lowest possible cost insurance available to meet their needs.”195 In
Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., the Southern District of New
York held that broker-dealers have “no duty to make comparisons to the
products of [their] competitors.”196

190. SEC v. Gruss, 859 F. Supp. 2d 653, 662 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Morrison v.
Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)) (emphasis added).
191. S. Rep. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960).
192. IA Release No. 626, supra note 68.
193. Id. at 19224.
194. Id. at 19225.
195. Emerson Elec. Co. v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 362 S.W.3d 7, 9 (Mo. 2012).
196. Castillo v. Dean Witter Discover & Co., No. 97 Civ. 1272(RPP), 1998 WL
342050, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1998).
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The heightened fiduciary duty which must be adhered to by an
investment adviser is derived from centuries-old common law finding
that the law will intervene to protect a vulnerable party from the
dominant party acting on conflicts of interest.197 The U.S. Supreme
Court, in its 1846 holding in Michoud v. Girod, held that:
The disability to purchase is a consequence of that relation between
them which imposes on the one a duty to protect the interest of the
other, from the faithful discharge of which duty his own personal
interest may withdraw him. In this conflict of interest, the law wisely
interposes. It acts not on the possibility, that, in some cases, the
sense of that duty may prevail over the motives of self-interest, but it
provides against the probability in many cases, and the danger in all
cases, that the dictates of self-interest will exercise a predominant
influence, and supersede that of duty. It therefore prohibits a party
from purchasing on his own account that which his duty or trust
requires him to sell on account of another, and from purchasing on
account of another that which he sells on his own account. In effect,
he is not allowed to unite the two opposite characters of buyer and
seller, because his interests, when he is the seller or buyer on his
own account, are directly conflicting with those of the person on
198
whose account he buys or sells.

Michoud reflects that as far back as the mid-19th Century, courts
were wary of conflicts of interest and how they would affect the
relationships between the dominant and more vulnerable party.
Based upon the discussion above, it would not be proper to apply
Exchange Act precedent to conduct that is more properly regulated
under the Advisers Act. Opponents are correct when they argue that the
Advisers Act was not designed to regulate broker-dealer activity;199
however, as noted above, when broker-dealers are providing
personalized investment advice, they are no longer acting as brokerdealers. To emphasize this point, the Third Circuit in Belmont stated that
“[b]roker-dealers are exempted from [the Advisers Act], provided that
197.
198.
199.

See supra Part IV.A.
Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. 503, 555 (1846).
See Letter from Ira D. Hammerman, Senior Managing Director and General
Counsel, SIFMA, to Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC, Framework for Rulemaking
under Section 913 (Fiduciary Duty) of the Dodd-Frank Act (July 14, 2011) at 11,
available at https://www.sec.gov/comments/4-606/4606-2952.pdf (“The Advisers Act
was not intended or designed to apply to the incidental advice offered by brokerdealers.”).
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they are not otherwise acting as investment advisers.”200 This is a critical
distinction that a majority of courts rely upon when finding that a
broker-dealer owes a fiduciary obligation to his or her client when
providing personalized investment advice.201 Advisers Act precedent has
developed over the past 75 years to address the specific conduct that
would be regulated under a uniform fiduciary standard of care.202
D. CONFLICTING STANDARDS: REGULATORY ARBITRAGE
Under the current regulatory system, financial advisors are able to
“switch hats” and provide services under different standards of care.
This issue of regulatory arbitrage “consists of those financial
transactions designed specifically to reduce costs or capture profit
opportunities created by differential regulations or laws.”203 Regulatory
arbitrage “undermines the efficiency of regulatory competition, shifts
the incidence of regulatory costs, and fosters a lack of transparency and
accountability that undermines the rule of law.”204 In the context of
financial service providers, individuals will hold themselves out as
financial planners to exploit the difference between the ways different
regulatory regimes treat a transaction.
The SEC staff has also previously taken positions that appear to
authorize regulatory arbitrage. In a January 1986 No-Action letter
provided to a registered representative of a broker-dealer, the SEC stated
that it would not “take any enforcement action if you, a registered
200.
201.
202.

Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 501 n.36 (3d Cir. 2013).
See supra Part IV.B.
Daniel M. Gallagher, Commissioner, SEC, Speech at the 2015 Virginia Law
and Business Review Symposium: Bank Regulators at the Gates: The Misguided Quest
for Prudential Regulation of Asset Managers (Apr. 10, 2015), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/041015-spch-cdmg.html (“For more than seven
decades, the 1940 Acts have enabled the SEC to fairly and effectively oversee the asset
management industry in a manner consistent with our statutory mission.”).
203. Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbitrage,
22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997).
204. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 230 (2010)
(“[W]hen new forms are chosen because they reduce regulatory costs and increase
transaction costs compared to the old structure, we lose twice: efficiency is reduced by
the increase in transaction costs, and the regulatory burden is shifted onto those who
cannot engage in arbitrage. Worse yet, if everyone engages in the arbitrage, all we have
done is increased transaction costs with no net change in the incidence of the regulatory
burden.”).
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representative of a registered broker-dealer, hold yourself out to the
public as a financial planner without registering as an investment adviser
under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, so long as your financial
planning activities are conducted solely in your capacity as a registered
representative of your broker-dealer.”205 In a December 2005 No-Action
letter provided to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets
Association (SIFMA), the SEC wrote that:
As a general matter, a broker-dealer/investment adviser may
discontinue its advisory relationship with its client and then assume a
brokerage relationship. An advisory contract, for example, may
contain a provision under which both parties agree to terminate the
advisory relationship, or either party may initiate the termination of
the advisory relationship . . . . The extent to which the brokerdealer/investment adviser would thereby limit the scope of its
fiduciary obligations to the client would turn, in our view, on
whether the broker-dealer/investment adviser has provided the client
full disclosure about the change in the relationship and any
consequent change in the obligations assumed by the broker206
dealer.

The letter also stated that SEC rules do “not require a broker-dealer
to treat as an investment advisory client a customer to whom the brokerdealer merely makes it known that financial planning or other
investment advisory services are available but to whom the brokerdealer does not provide such services.”207
In In re IFG Network Securities, Inc., the SEC found that there was
“no case precedent that holds that an associated person of an investment
adviser cannot change hats . . . and act in the capacity of an associated
person of a broker-dealer without the higher obligations of an
adviser.”208 In that case, a registered representative differentiated

205. Elmer D. Robinson, SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 SEC LEXIS 1610, at *1 (Jan.
6, 1986).
206. SIFMA, SEC No-Action Letter, 2005 WL 3526529, at *3 (Dec. 16, 2005).
207. Id. at *1.
208. In re IFG Network Securities, Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 273, SEC File
No. 3-11179 (Feb. 10, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/aljdec/id273cff.htm
[hereinafter Initial Decision Rel. No. 273]. This decision was overturned on appeal by
the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, and a Commission opinion was rendered on July
11, 2006. See In re IFG Network Securities, Inc., Exchange Act Release. No. 54127,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2533, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-11179 (July 11,

2015]

BROKER-DEALER:
A FIDUCIARY BY ANY OTHER NAME?

681

between his advisory and broker-dealer services and explained to
customers that he charged a fee for advisory services and was paid by a
commission for brokerage services when he sold mutual funds to
them.209 The SEC further held that “[e]ach customer had sufficient
education and cognitive skills to ask questions and to study and
understand mutual fund prospectuses had he or she made the effort . . . .
In short, each customer, based on the information available to him or her
and his or her ability to interpret, could have independently evaluated
his or her broker’s recommendations.”210 It is important to note the
departure of this reasoning from other case law. As discussed
previously, consumers are generally not aware of the difference in the
standards of care of broker-dealers, investment advisers, wealth
managers, or financial planners and do not have the requisite education
and financial literacy.211
In its 2007 Interpretive Rule Release (IA-2652), published after the
FPA v. SEC decision, the SEC specifically states that a dually registered
advisor is only an investment adviser with respect to those accounts for
which it provides advice or receives compensation that would subject
the advisor to the Advisers Act.212
The blurring of the lines is most apparent for dual registrants, those
who are registered as both an investment adviser and broker-dealer. In
Western Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio vs. Graben, the Texas
Court of Appeals found that a dual registrant crossed the line in holding
itself out as a financial advisor, by stating that ongoing advice would be
provided. In doing so the dual registrant was found to have formed a
relationship of trust and confidence with the customers to which
fiduciary status attached.213 The court reasoned that:
[W]hen a person . . . is acting as a financial advisor, that role extends
well beyond a simple arms’-length business transaction. An
unsophisticated investor is necessarily entrusting his funds to one
who is representing that he will place the funds in a suitable
investment and manage the funds appropriately for the benefit of his
2006). However, the SEC opinion does not address the issue of conversion from an
advisory relationship to a non-advisory relationship.
209. Initial Decision Rel. No. 273.
210. Id.
211. See supra Part IV.B.
212. SEC Release No. IA-2652, 17 C.F.R. 275, 16 (2007).
213. W. Reserve Life Assurance Co. of Ohio v. Graben, 233 S.W.3d 360 (Tex. App.
2007).
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investor/entrustor. The relationship goes well beyond a traditional
arms’-length business transaction that provides ‘mutual benefit’ for
214
both parties.

In Safer v. Nelson Financial Group, plaintiffs entered into various
agreements with defendant, an independent registered investment
advisor (“RIA”) based in Ohio who was affiliated with a brokerdealer.215 The Advisory Agreement specifically stated that it
“terminate[d] upon the delivery of the Written Financial Plan.”216 The
plaintiffs, who lost 50 percent of their portfolio value over a three-year
period, argued that they had no problem with the trades, or
implementation of the financial plan, but it was the advice that was
flawed.217 The court held that the “Advisory Agreement, which
pertained to investment advice, was separate and distinct from the New
Account Information Forms, which pertained to the execution of that
advice” and that the advisory agreement terminated upon delivery of the
financial plan.218 Even though the court does not specifically discuss
fiduciary duties arising under common law, it indirectly discusses the
question of when the advisory part of a financial planning relationship
ends and a brokerage relationship designed to implement the plan
begins.219 States have attempted to tackle this issue, but there is no
consensus on when a fiduciary duty is owed.
Ron Rhoades, Assistant Professor in the Alfred State Department of
Business Studies, has analyzed broker-dealer / RIA firms which
primarily market their services as undertaking “financial plans.”
Professor Rhoades states that:
[W]hen it comes to implementation of the plan, many (if not most)
of the representatives of this firm ‘switch hats’ to a non-fiduciary
role and sell products (which are often proprietary mutual funds). In
reality, under fiduciary law the requirements to ‘remove the
fiduciary hat’ and switch to a non-fiduciary role are very stringent.
Indeed, the disclosures required (if switching hats would be
permitted at all) are such that no client of sound mind and
understanding—if they were informed of all of the facts relating to
such a switch (as would be required of a fiduciary) would provide
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id. at 374.
Safer v. Nelson Fin. Grp., Inc., 422 F.3d 289, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 295.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 297.
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informed consent to the switch. This practice exists commonly in
[the industry]. It’s a travesty that bait and switch occurs in such a
220
widespread fashion.

Michael Chamberlain, principal of Chamberlain Financial Planning
LLC, has posed the question that when financial advisors are dual
registrants, “how are clients ever to know if the representative is
wearing the [investment adviser] hat and giving advice or the [brokerdealer] hat and selling a product?”221 As dual registrants, broker-dealers,
acting as “financial planners”, can develop the financial plan under the
affiliated investment adviser, while implementing certain financial
planning recommendations, such as the purchase or sale of investment
and insurance products, under other financial services laws.222 Investors
are harmed when financial advisors are able to “switch hats” and
provide services under different standards of care.223
V. REGULATORY AND POLICY SOLUTIONS
The cases cited above underscore investor confusion regarding the
differences between broker-dealers and investment advisers and
demonstrate why having two different legal duties for broker-dealers
and investment advisers diminishes investor protection.224 These cases
also provide a guide for how broker-dealers may push proprietary
products without disclosing the incentive to the consumer “so long as
the product being sold is suitable and the incentive is tied to its sale, a
broker may quietly put his or her own interests above those of the

220. Ron A. Rhoades, Fiduciary Duties: What Policymakers and the Public Need to
Know, BROKER AND BROKER (June 22, 2009), http://www.brokeandbroker.com/
index.php?a=blog&id=203 (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
221. Michael Chamberlain, Let’s Call a Spade a Spade and a Salesperson a
Salesperson, INVESTMENTNEWS (Oct. 4, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/
article/20Vi091004/REG/310049996 (last visited Jan. 6, 2015).
222. See generally GAO, REGULATORY COVERAGE GENERALLY EXISTS FOR
FINANCIAL PLANNERS, BUT CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES REMAIN 11 (JAN. 2011)
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/314684.pdf (“The regulatory system for
financial planners covers most activities in which they engage. However, enforcement
of regulation may be inconsistent and some questions exist about consumers’
understanding of the roles, standards of care, and titles and designations that a financial
planner may have.”).
223. See Fleischer, supra note 202.
224. See supra Part IV.D.
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consumer.”225 They also provide a guide for how brokers can avoid
being regulated as a fiduciary by only providing occasional advice to
clients.226 This section will provide possible solutions for the SEC to
combat these abuses.
A. RULEMAKING UNDER THE ADVISERS ACT: NARROWING THE SOLELY
INCIDENTAL EXEMPTION FOR BROKER-DEALERS
The cleanest solution for reducing harm to investors would be to
narrow the “solely incidental” exemption for broker-dealers under the
Advisers Act. This method avoids having to craft regulation for both
investment advisers and broker-dealers under the Advisers Act and
Exchange Act, respectively. This would also align the regulations with
common law, where broker-dealers have been traditionally held to a
fiduciary standard of care when proving personalized investment advice.
This method was also recommended by the SEC Investment
Advisory Committee227 in November 2013. The Committee wrote that it
favors an approach that involves rulemaking under the Investment
Advisers Act to narrow the broker-dealer exclusion from the Act
while providing a safe harbor for brokers who do not engage in
broader investment advisory services or hold themselves out as
providing such services . . . . By significantly narrowing of [sic] the
broker-dealer exclusion from the Investment Advisers Act, such an
approach would restore the functional regulation intended by
Congress when it adopted the ‘34 and ‘40 Acts. Under such an
approach, broker-dealers who choose to offer personalized
investment advice to retail investors, such as retirement planning or
investment planning, that goes beyond the buy/sell recommendations
inherent to securities transactions would be regulated in the same

225. Jeremy Liles, Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.: Semantics,
Fiduciary Duty, and an Outdated Distinction, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 457, 471 (2012).
226. See supra Part IV.A.1.a.
227. Investment Advisory Committee, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investoradvisory-committee-2012.shtml (“Section 911 of the Dodd-Frank Act established the
new Investor Advisory Committee to advise the Commission on regulatory priorities,
the regulation of securities products, trading strategies, fee structures, the effectiveness
of disclosure, and on initiatives to protect investor interests and to promote investor
confidence and the integrity of the securities marketplace. The Dodd-Frank Act
authorizes the committee to submit findings and recommendations for review and
consideration by the Commission.”).
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fashion as other investment advisers when they engage in those
228
advisory activities.

The Committee went on to note that “[b]roker-dealers who ‘hold
themselves out’ as advisers, based either on the titles they use or the
manner in which they market their services, would be precluded from
relying on the exclusion.”229
This approach aligns with the state legislation that was reviewed by
Congress during passage of the Adviser Act.230 That language stated,
“investment counsel or advice, whether by one specializing solely in
rendering investment counsel or advice, or by a dealer or broker,
incidental to usual transactions in securities, shall be strictly on the basis
of fiduciary relationship between the counselor or advisor and the
investor or prospective investor.”231
B. SEC POLICY STATEMENT: PROVIDE PROSPECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE FOR BROKER-DEALERS
As an alternative to narrowing the broker-dealer exemption under
the Advisers Act, the SEC could issue a policy statement that provides
guidance on the broker-dealer exemption in the Advisers Act, and how
the SEC will enforce its provisions moving forward.
There are generally three types of agency action: legislative rules,
interpretive rules, and policy statements. Based upon varied analysis
from the courts, the distinction between these actions has been described
as “‘tenuous,’ ‘fuzzy,’ ‘blurred,’ and, perhaps most picturesquely,
‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’”232 These actions were stated most
clearly in a recent D.C. Circuit decision:
[a]n agency action that purports to impose legally binding
obligations or prohibitions on regulated parties—and that would be
the basis for an enforcement action for violations of those

228. Investment Advisory Committee, Recommendation of the Investor as
Purchaser Subcommittee Broker-Dealer Fiduciary Duty 2, 5 (SEC, Draft, Nov. 22,
2013), http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/fiduciary-dutyrecommendation.pdf.
229. Id.
230. Investment Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 before a
Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
231. Id. at 1006.
232. Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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obligations or requirements—is a legislative rule . . . . (As to
interpretive rules, an agency action that merely interprets a prior
statute or regulation, and does not itself purport to impose new
obligations or prohibitions or requirements on regulated parties, is an
interpretive rule.) An agency action that merely explains how the
agency will enforce a statute or regulation—in other words, how it
will exercise its broad enforcement discretion or permitting
discretion under some extant statute or rule-is a general statement of
233
policy.

An important distinction is that “the case law is clear that [courts]
lack authority to review claims under the APA ‘where an agency merely
expresses its view of what the law requires of a party, even if that view
is adverse to the party.’”234 A recent decision from the D.C. District
Court stated that the CFTC action concerning cross-border swaps did
not qualify as “final agency action” because, as part interpretive rule and
part policy statement, it is not “finally determinative of the issues or
rights to which [it is] addressed.”235
The SEC can make a general policy statement that they will be
enforcing such a provision. This will put financial advisors on notice
and provide them with guidance on if and when they may need to
register as an investment adviser. The SEC can provide guidance on
when a financial advisor is providing personalized investment advice
that is not solely incidental to their broker-dealer practice. Under the
Exchange Act, a broker is defined as an individual who is “engaged in
the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of
others.”236
The SEC should use the “holding out” standard that has been
developed over the past thirty years. For example, in SEC Release IA1092, the SEC provided guidance on the applicability of the Advisers
Act on financial planners and pension consultants. The staff considered
a “person to be ‘in the business’ of providing advice if the person: (i)
holds himself out as an investment adviser or as one who provides
233.
234.

Nat’l. Mining Ass’n. v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251-52 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798,
808 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n. v EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427
(D.C. Cir. 2004)).
235. SIFMA v. CFTC, No. CV 13-1916 (PLF), 2014 WL 4629567, at *71 (D.D.C.
Sept. 16, 2014) (quoting Am. Tort Reform Ass’n v. Occupational Safely & Health
Admin, 738 F.3d 387, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2013)).
236. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (2012).
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investment advice.”237 Recently, in March 2013, the staff of the
Investment Adviser Regulation Office provided guidance concerning
when to register as an investment adviser. The staff viewed
a person as holding himself out as an adviser if he advertises as an
investment adviser or financial planner, uses letterhead indicating
activity as an investment adviser, or maintains a telephone listing or
otherwise lets it be known that he will accept new advisory clients,
238
or hires a person to solicit clients on his behalf.

The SEC could also look to the common law usage of “holding
out.” For example, courts have held that when a bank holds itself out as
an “investment planner,” “financial planner,” or “financial advisor,” “a
fiduciary duty may arise in such circumstances.239 Courts have also
found that by holding oneself out as a disinterested adviser, a brokerdealer must act in the customer’s best interest, disclosing conflicts of
interest and recommending the best investment among alternatives.240
To be exempt from investment adviser registration, the brokerdealer must also not receive any special compensation. Generally, both
the SEC and the courts have found that by charging any type of fee
specifically for investment advice, outside of brokerage commissions,
the broker would be receiving special compensation and therefore not
qualify for the exemption. The legislative history of the Advisers Act
speaks to this prong. In the Senate Bill, the Senate interprets investment
advice as qualifying for the exemption if the only compensation the
broker receives is comprised of commissions, i.e., compensation for
closing the sale as opposed to compensation, such as advice fees, for
providing investment advice.241 The SEC has also weighed in upon this
issue. In a 1978 Release, the SEC Division of Investment Management
found that

237. Applicability of the Inv. Advisers Act to Fin. Planners, Pensions Consultants,
and Other Persons Who Provide Inv. Advisory Services as a Component of Other Fin.
Servs., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092, 52 Fed. Reg. 38400 (Oct. 8, 1987).
238. SEC INVESTMENT ADVISER REGULATION OFFICE, DIVISION OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 13 (Mar. 2013), available at https://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf.
239. Hatleberg v. Norwest Bank Wisconsin, 283 Wis.2d 234, 252-53 (Wisc. 2005).
240. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1992).
241. S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22.
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‘special compensation’ for investment advice is compensation to the
broker-dealer in excess of that which he would be paid for providing
a brokerage or dealer service alone . . . . The Division of Investment
Management regards special compensation as existing only where
there is a clearly definable charge for investment advice. This
reflects the Division’s position that a client who perceives that he is
paying a charge specifically for investment advice is entitled to the
242
protections of the Advisers Act.

This language is important, because it discusses the perception of
the client, which also folds into the “holding out” discussion. For
example, if a broker is holding him or her self out as an investment
adviser, it would follow that the client would believe that the advisor
was at least in part compensated for investment advice.
The SEC Notice would be a two-prong guideline. The first prong
would provide guidance on how the SEC will be enforcing the “solely
incidental” provision. The SEC can provide that any broker-dealer who
holds themselves out as an investment adviser, financial planner or other
term (e.g. investment counsel) that would lead a client to believe that
they were in the business of providing investment advice, would
generally have to register as an investment adviser. The guidance would
also provide that if the broker provides advice not related to the sale of
securities or provides continuing advice and guidance on securities to
the client, the broker-dealer would generally have to register as an
investment adviser. The second prong would provide guidance on
enforcement of the “special compensation” provision. The SEC can
provide that if a broker receives a fee for providing investment advice or
markets their services in a way that the client would believe they were
getting paid for investment advice, the broker-dealer would generally
have to register as an investment adviser. For example, if the broker
received any compensation in addition to the commissions they would
earn on the sale of product, the broker would generally have to register
as an investment adviser. If nothing else, this could lead to more
transparency and a clearer description of how broker-dealers are
compensated.
Importantly, these determinations would still be made by the SEC
on a case-by-case basis.243 They would not be imposing any new
242.
243.

SEC IA Rel. No. 626, supra note 68.
See Lori A. Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, SEC, Address at the Eighth Annual Investment Adviser Compliance
Summit (Feb. 27, 2006) (“Probably no statute or set of rules could contemplate the
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regulatory burden on brokers, they would only be providing guidance on
existing regulations. The notice would hopefully spur broker-dealers to
either stop providing investment advice as their primary function or in
the alternative, prompt the broker-dealer to register as an investment
adviser and be subject to the fiduciary standard of care for the advice
they are providing.
Further, this notice would not be subject to judicial review based
upon the recent CFTC holding from the D.C. District Court and D.C.
Circuit. The SEC would not have to go through Congress or even go
through the notice and comment process under the APA. Policy
statements announce standards that an agency intends to apply in future
enforcement actions. As noted above, the courts “lack authority to
review claims under the APA ‘where an agency merely expresses its
view of what the law requires of a party, even if that view is adverse to
the party.’”244
Even if an interest group argues that the guidance will have a
negative impact on the financial services industry, the courts have held
that “the mere fact that [an agency action] may have a substantial impact
does not transform it into a legislative rule.”245 Furthermore, the D.C.
District Court recently found that an agency’s decision to provide a
policy statement actually benefits market participants and provides
clarity on how the agency will enforce regulation.246
C. DODD-FRANK SECTION 913 UNIFORM FIDUCIARY STANDARD
The alternative to removing the broker-dealer exemption from the
Advisers Act is rule-making under Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank
Act.247 Section 913 of Dodd-Frank directed the SEC to conduct a study
variety of factual situations and decisions that an advisory firm faces. Can you imagine
the number of rules and releases and regulations that this would require? Instead, the
Advisers Act incorporates an adviser’s fiduciary duty under Section 206, and envisions
that, in whatever factual scenario, the adviser will act in the best interests of his
clients.”).
244. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l. Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 452 F.3d 798,
808 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n. v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427
(D.C. Cir. 2004)).
245. SIFMA v. CFTC, No. CV 13-1916, 2014 WL 4629567, at *68 (D.D.C. Sept.
16, 2014) (citing Cent. Texas Tel. Coop. v. FCC, 402 F.3d 205, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
246. Id.
247. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1824–30 (2010)
(codified as enacted in 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2012)).
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to evaluate the effectiveness of the legal and regulatory standards for
broker-dealers and investment advisers and persons associated with
those firms.248 It includes the discretionary rule-making provision
regarding a uniform fiduciary standard of conduct for investment
advisers and broker-dealers.249 Section 913 gives the SEC specific
authority to establish a fiduciary duty for broker-dealers. The rule states
that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act or the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, the Commission may promulgate rules to
provide that, with respect to a broker or dealer, when providing
personalized investment advice about securities to a retail customer
(and such other customers as the Commission may by rule provide),
the standard of conduct for such broker or dealer with respect to such
customer shall be the same as the standard of conduct applicable to
an investment adviser under section 211 of the Investment Advisers
250
Act of 1940.

Section 211 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 states that:
The Commission may promulgate rules to provide that the standard
of conduct for all brokers, dealers, and investment advisers, when
providing personalized investment advice about securities to retail
customers (and such other customers as the Commission may by rule
provide), shall be to act in the best interest of the customer without
regard to the financial or other interest of the broker, dealer, or
251
investment adviser providing the advice.

Significantly, the SEC also made clear that any fiduciary rule
applied to broker-dealers shall be no less stringent than the current
fiduciary standard under Section 206 of the Advisers Act.252 Section 913
also states that the receipt of commission-based compensation and the
sale of proprietary or other limited ranges of products will not, by itself,
violate the standard.253

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See SEC Staff Study, supra note 94.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g)(1) (2012).
15 U.S.C. § 78o(k)(1).
15 U.S.C. § 80b-11(g)(1).
Section 206 of the Advisers Act contains provisions prohibiting fraud and
deceit upon clients and also contains provisions discussing the practice of principal
transactions. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6.
253. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1828 (2010).
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1. Core Principles
This Article outlines the core principles that will provide the
foundation for implementation of a uniform fiduciary standard of
conduct for investment advisers and broker-dealers as authorized by
Section 913 of Dodd-Frank.
The first, and most important, core principle is that the uniform
fiduciary duty must include a “best interest” obligation as stated in
Dodd-Frank Section 913.254 Section 913 states that the SEC “may
promulgate rules to provide that the standard of conduct for all brokers,
dealers, and investment advisers, when providing personalized
investment advice about securities to retail customers (and such other
customers as the Commission may by rule provide), shall be to act in the
best interest of the customer without regard to the financial or other
interest of the broker, dealer, or investment adviser providing the
advice.”255 Per Section 913, the uniform fiduciary standard of conduct
will be no less stringent than the fiduciary standard currently applicable
to investment advisers under the Advisers Act, which at a minimum
includes the duties of loyalty and care as interpreted and developed
under Sections 206(1) and (2) of the Advisers Act.256
Any uniform fiduciary duty should be business-model neutral,
meaning that the standard of conduct will be neutral as to the businessmodel and compensation structure of the financial service provider. The
uniform fiduciary standard of conduct should also be principles-based.
Given the equitable nature of fiduciary law, it is not tenable to set
forth a fiduciary’s responsibilities in a detailed manner or to specify
a convention to govern their activity. Nor would it be in the public
interest to do so. And it certainly would not be consistent with the

254. “Under the Advisers Act, an adviser is a fiduciary whose duty is to serve the
best interests of its clients, which includes an obligation not to subrogate clients’
interests to its own.” Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No.
3060, 17 C.F.R. 275, 279, 3 (July 28, 2010). The fiduciary standard has also been
summarized as a “prudent investor” standard: the fiduciary “shall invest and manage
[client] assets as a prudent investor would” and “shall exercise reasonable care, skill,
and caution.” National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Prudent Investor Act, § 2 (1994), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/
docs/prudent%20investor/upia_final_94.pdf.
255. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-11.
256. Id.
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way fiduciary law has evolved and been interpreted for hundreds of
257
years.

To this end, existing guidance and precedent under the Advisers
Act regarding a fiduciary standard of care, as developed primarily
through SEC interpretive pronouncements, numerous enforcement
actions and case law, will continue to apply to investment advisers and
be extended to broker-dealers, as applicable, under the uniform fiduciary
standard of care.258 It is also important to note that while increased
disclosure of conflicts of interest is a beneficial step, is not necessarily
sufficient by itself to meet a fiduciary duty standard.
The uniform fiduciary duty would apply to broker-dealers and
investment advisers under the new authority in Exchange Act Section
15(k) and Advisers Act Section 211(g), respectively.259 Any
promulgated uniform fiduciary rule will have to provide further
guidance to financial service providers, but should be based upon the
principles listed above.
CONCLUSION
The problem of conflicting standards has plagued the financial
services industry for far too long. Over the past four decades, the role of
brokers has changed to where they operate in a similar fashion to
investment advisers and hold themselves out to the public as trusted
financial advisors who provide unbiased investment advice. The current
conflicting standards harm consumers by allowing financial service
providers to present themselves as impartial and unbiased advisors,
while in actuality they are salesman that are only providing advice as a
way to sell more expensive and complex products. An overwhelming
majority of retail customers are further harmed because they are unable
to determine which financial service providers are legally obligated to
provide advice and services in their best interests.
257. Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Director, Investment Adviser
Association, Study Regarding Obligations of Brokers, Dealers, and Investment
Advisers, Rel. No. IA-3058; File No. 4-606, n.15 (Aug. 30, 2010) (quoting Michael
Koffler, Six Degrees of Separation: Principles to Guide the Regulation of BrokerDealers and Investment Advisers, 41 SEC. REG. & LAW REP. 776 (Apr. 27, 2009)).
258. It is important to note that this view is supported by the SEC staff. SEC Staff
Study, supra note 94, at 165.
259. See SEC Staff Study, supra note 94, at 109.
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As this article shows, there is ample evidence that, under common
law, brokers who provide services beyond buying and selling are held to
a fiduciary standard of care. The SEC has the authority to conduct a
rulemaking, which would codify the long-standing common law
fiduciary duty, and abolish the arcane overlapping system that is
currently in place. To date, no such action has been taken.260

260. See Waddell, supra note 150. SEC Chair Mary Jo White has stated publicly
that she believes that a uniform fiduciary rule should be promulgated under Section 913
of Dodd-Frank; however, there has been no official agency action.

